Essays in Mechanism Design by Gizatulina, Alia
Essays in Mechanism Design
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universität Mannheim
vorgelegt von
Alia Gizatulina
Mai 2009
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Enno Mammen
Referent: Prof. Martin Hellwig, Ph.D.
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
Tag der Verteidigung: 13.07.2009
Contents
Contents i
Introduction iv
1 Endogenous Trade Enforcement Institutions 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Transactions under Di¤erent Governance Modes . . . . . . . 7
1.3 The Contribution Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Some Extensions and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2 On Uniqueness of Payo¤s to Beliefs 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 The Basic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 The BDP Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 Genericity Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Details Behind Belief Hierarchies Matter 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 Type Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5 Discussion: Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
i
CONTENTS ii
Bibliography 86
A Appendix 89
A.1 Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.2 Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Martin Hellwig for everything I have learnt from him,
for his condence and unmatched patience with my ideas, questions and
struggles. The depth and width of his own knowledge in economics and his
enthusiasm about a whole variety of issues have been providing the freedom
to explore any question and let me never be ennuied by doing economics.
I also would like to thank Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden as the director
of the doctoral school for his openness to discuss any possible matter, his
solutions to those matters, his support of conference trips and academic
visits and for all encouraging feedback on my research.
Of course I would like to thank all my friends who have been with me on
this path along the years. All "Les Russes" in Toulouse and especially Elena
and Igor who, during my studies there, were transmitting to me tirelessly
their own knowledge in math and economics; without it I think I would
have never dared to start a PhD. Sava and Xuanlai for their camaraderie in
sharing years in the terric L13 of Mannheim. Nina and Evguenia for our
fun during lunches in the Ehrenhof. Hélène and Jan for all their support and
a countless number of warm dinners at their home in Heidelberg. Johannes
for all care and for being a big source of rational decisions. Giulio who has
been reminding me nicely of a bigger picture. And I owe a lot to Aude for
indiscribable amounts of all-dimensional help and for having shown me all
those unforgettable mountains that made many week-ends so beautiful.
But most of all I would like to thank my mother for her optimism and
strength which, despite the distance between us, have supported me during
these years like nothing else.
iii
Introduction
The subject of the thesis
The main purpose of my thesis is to study di¤erent aspects of design of
mechanisms or games that economic agents could play in order to achieve
outcome that would improve welfare of everyone.
Because agentsselsh and uncoordinated behaviour may result in so-
cially and individually ine¢ cient outcomes, all agents may agree that insti-
tutions or collective mechanisms, curbing individual selsh interests should
be introduced in a way that does not damage freedoms of anyone on the
other hand. The mechanism design literature working on e¢ cient mech-
anisms analyzes exactly this problem which economic institution is the
best from the perspective of each individual to achieve a given allocative
goal in a given environment. Among examples of such designed institutions
are auctions, voting mechanisms or tolls on highways introduced to cover
the costs of highway.
As quite often agents payo¤s from their behaviour and hence their incen-
tives to behave that or another way are known only by agents themselves
the optimal design of a mechanism should account for such unknowns 
any allocation that could result from agents behaving within the rules of
the designed institution should be incentive compatible, i.e. optimal from
agents individual perspective given his payo¤ from this allocation, even if
this payo¤ is known only by each agent himself.
Also, as in most of reasonable situations agents have a freedom to opt
away from the allocation that they may expect from the mechanism, the
anticipated allocation should be individually rational, i.e., not worse than
what they could achieve by not participating in the proposed game.
Finally, as often a group of agents may not count to have additional
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resources from an external world any outcome resulting from a play within
the designed institution should satisfy the budget balance condition.
The three works in the thesis contribute exactly to this branch of the
literature design of socially optimal mechanisms which would satisfy in-
centive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance conditions.
Though, being unied by this theme, three chapters touch quite di¤erent
sides of this vast subject.
Chapter I
In the rst chapter I study a problem of optimal design of a contribution
game which agents should play in order to collect resources to cover up-front
costs of a common punishment system that would enforce their trades with
each other.
In many economic transactions agents have some scope for behaviour
which is individually protable but damaging for a trading partner. For
example, a buyer, once he receives a purchased good could decide to skip
paying some part of the price if it should be made over time. The seller, in
turn, may renege on promised warranty services once the buyer has paid all
what is due. Anticipating such behaviour most of agents are likely not to
start trading at all. Nowadays, for most of such transactions, trading agents
may conclude a contract specifying obligations of parties to each other and
which would be subject to enforcement by the o¢ cial legal system.
In a small group of agents, repeating interactions and reputation con-
cerns usually allow agents to sustain mutually benecial behaviour without
any threat of recurrence for arbitration to some third party like a legal sys-
tem. However, as Dixit (2003b) has argued, when an economys size grows
on the one hand there are likely to be large gains from trade expansion be-
yond a small group but on the other hand there is a decrease in possibility
for repeated interactions. As a result, in order to sustain cooperation and to
perceive gains from trade a third party enforcement services should become
available.
In order to resolve any single dispute a legal or other contract enforce-
ment system needs to invest a substantial amount of resources into its ca-
pacity up-front, which no single individual is likely to be able to cover on
his own. For example, if it is the legal system, it needs resources to generate
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laws, to establish a court to adjudicate and a police to enforce the courts
decisions. As those are done by agents, their incentives to do it properly
should be aligned accordingly. Dixit (2003a) demonstrates that curbing op-
portunistic incentives of adjudicators has non-negligible costs which a single
individual may not be able to bear.
That is why it seems to be important to understand how a large group
of agents may organize itself in order to cover all necessary costs and to in-
troduce a collective trade enforcement institution. Obviously, each agents
incentives to contribute to a collective system which would enforce his trades
depends on how much he gains from trading and what are alternative ways
for him to enforce his rights within a contract. Usually agents are heteroge-
neous in these gains and so they di¤er in their valuation for a given contract
enforcement system. To capture this, in the paper I model explicitly details
of two di¤erent contract enforcement systems through which agents may
enforce their trades.
The rst system is called asymmetric. It enforces agreements of agents
unequally and depending on their exogenously heterogeneous resource en-
dowments. Namely, in a match of any two agents such that one has more
resources than another, an agent who is stronger, when he cheats on his
weaker encounter, is able to avoid punishment. Whereas if it is a weaker
agent who cheats on the strong one he is punished by the latter who receives
from the weak a dedamaging payment. This model arguably captures many
ine¢ cient legal systems that exist in the world.
The second system is symmetric, in the sense that it punishes for misbe-
haviour independently of agentsprivate resources. Whereas the asymmetric
system does not have any xed costs to function, this system, to be e¢ cient
and impartial, requires an up-front investment. Because of its xed cost and
given that it is largely non-rival (as once it is on place no agent has incen-
tives to cheat on his encounter anticipating punishment) it has properties
of a public good. And moreover as it is possible to exclude agents from its
services, it is an excludable public good.
The analysis of distribution of gains from trade under two systems gives
the following. If the asymmetric system is e¢ cient and capable to impose
high punishments for misbehaviour these are the strong who prefer that the
only contract enforcement system that exists is the asymmetric one. For
relatively low levels of imposed punishment these are the weak who benet
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from the asymmetric system. Hence two systems cannot be Pareto ranked,
though on aggregate the symmetric system brings a higher social welfare.
Turning to the contribution game, the rst observation is that because
agents have to collect resources before the very rst trade is made, i.e. before
a trading partner and his resource strength are known, it is impossible to
condition directly each agents contribution to the system on his valuation
for the symmetric system, i.e. on his resources as those are unobservable
at the ex ante stage. Hence this is the game of incomplete information
and given that I consider a large economy, as it is known from the existing
literature (see Hellwig (2007)), the only mechanism which may collect a
positive amount of resources for a public good is the mechanism based on
exclusion of those who do not pay for the public good from its consumption.
In other words, I could directly search for an optimal mechanism within
a class of mechanisms called "the admission fee mechanisms", where each
agent pays an admission fee for being allowed to use the public good.
The following observation is that because admission to punishing by its
very nature is two dimensional, i.e. each agent could be allowed to punish his
trading encounter and he could be allowed to be punished himself, exclusion
of non-payers takes also a two-dimensional form. Hence, in a trade of anyone
who is admitted to the symmetric punishment system and the one who is
not, there may be three possible way to exclude non-payer: 1. "Full" he
may be excluded from both ability to punish and ability to be punished; 2.
"Partial" he may be excluded only from ability to punish, but he could be
yet punished by anyone who has contributed to the costs; 3. "Quasi-none" 
if at least one agent in a match has contributed to the costs of the symmetric
system in their trade both of them could punish and being punished by that
system.
The result for the contribution game are the following. If the costs of
the symmetric punishment system are very high, it is optimal to employ the
admission mechanism based on the full exclusion rule. For an intermediary
level of costs, the partial exclusion rule would su¢ ce. And nally for low
costs it is the quasi-none exclusion rule that is optimal. The optimal choice
among these exclusion rules happens not to be fully free and dependent
only on the costs of the e¢ cient contract enforcement system. Each of the
exclusion rules allows for a multiplicity of equilibria and di¤erent equilibria
result in di¤erent levels of the social welfare. For a given exclusion rule, the
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worst equilibrium brings lower or higher welfare than the worst equilibrium
under another exclusion rule depending on the parameters of the trade (i.e.
gains from cheating on the trading partner) and the level of punishment
imposed by the systems.
To summarize, in general, for each level of the costs of the symmetric
system which it is e¢ cient to cover from a collective perspective, there is a
an exclusion rule which induces agents to pay their share to the cost. But
this exclusion may generate coordination failures and demand for services of
the asymmetric contract enforcement institutions may persist even if each
of agents who remains under the asymmetric system would gain if he starts
to govern his trades via the impartial institution.
Chapters II and III
A Unifying Theme
The second and the third chapters of my thesis are the joint project of
Martin Hellwig and me. A main idea of the project is to study robustness of
mechanism design results obtained in environments where agents types are
modelled by subset of types from the payo¤-based universal type space.
Harsanyi (1967/68) has suggested and Mertens and Zamir (1985) have
formalized that all strategically relevant information of an agent, i.e. his
payo¤ characteristic and his beliefs about otherspayo¤s and othersbeliefs
could be compactly represented by his "type". Thus, for any one who wishes
to analyze a given problem in a given environment with incomplete informa-
tion it su¢ ces to specify a prole of "types" and two mappings, one dening
how each agents types map into his payo¤s and another dening how each
agents types map into his beliefs about others types, and so, recursively,
into his beliefs about otherspayo¤s and othersbeliefs about everyone elses
payo¤ and so on. A collection of all possible payo¤s and belief mappings
together with corresponding abstract types constitutes what is called the
payo¤-based universal type space.
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have demonstrated that
the result of Crémer and McLean (1988) holds true only for a very special
and "small" set of types from the entire universal type space. Specically,
it is valid only in type spaces where payo¤ and belief mappings are such
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that with each possible belief type there associated a unique payo¤ type, as
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) name them the beliefs-
determine-preferences (BDP) environments. Heifetz and Neeman (2006)
parametrize all type spaces by priors that generate those types and show in
geometric and measure theoretic senses that priors generating BDP types
in the universal type space are non-generic.
In the papers we argue that the results, including the ones of Heifetz and
Neeman (2006) and Neeman (2004) obtained under the payo¤-based univer-
sal type space assumption, may lead to misleading conclusions. The main
reason for this is that types from the payo¤-based universal type spaces do
not account explicitly for correlation in agents information. In the paper
constituting the Chapter II we show that the BDP property is generic if
agentsheterogeneity in belief hierarchies is due to heterogeneity in infor-
mation, i.e. if beliefs mappings are endogenous they are derived from a
common prior conditionally on agentsinformation. In the paper of Chapter
III we show that for a given subset of types from the payo¤ based univer-
sal type space there may exist a variety of models accounting explicitly for
agents payo¤ characteristic and informative signals and where agentshi-
erarchies of beliefs about payo¤s would be exactly the same. However the
implementation possibility results may vary depending on the details of the
model.
Chapter II
We prove that in most of quasi-linear environments where agents share a
common prior about payo¤ uncertainty, any objective which is e¢ cient from
a social point of view could be achieved via a lottery mechanism where each
agent is volunteer to participate. We allow agentsprivate information to
be multidimensional  each agent possesses private information about his
payo¤ characteristic (which is one-dimensional) and he also receives a nite
number of signals giving him information about otherspayo¤s and others
signals.
The key feature why the mechanism designer is able to achieve any so-
cially e¢ cient outcome is due to the fact that under most of common priors
each agents beliefs about others payo¤s and otherssignals conditional on
his own information are fully informative about that information, i.e. about
his payo¤ characteristic and his signals. Thus, as it is known, in quasi-linear
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environments there exists a mechanism, developed by Crémer and McLean
(1988), where by o¤ering a menu of lotteries whose payo¤s are conditional
on the reports of all other agents, the mechanism designer could extract per-
fectly agentsbeliefs, by observing individual choices among these lotteries.
Consequently, if agents beliefs are unique to their private information, the
mechanism designer could learn it automatically as well from beliefs and
achieve allocative goals as if he had full information from the beginning.
Hence the main purpose of the paper is two show that for "most" of
common priors agents interim beliefs are unique to the information on which
they are conditioned. We distinguish two cases where agentstypes (payo¤s
and signals) belong to nite sets and where those are from intervals. The
proof techniques di¤er across two cases.
For the case with nite types the proof hinges upon the result that
in a space of all nite dimensional matrices, matrices having a full rank,
i.e. having its columns and rows linearly independent, are generic. Agents
belief types, conditional on their payo¤s and signals are just rows in a matrix
where columns are parametrized by all possible constellation of payo¤s and
signals of other agents. This matrix is proportional to the matrix of a prior
distribution of types and so if the matrix of posterior beliefs does not have
linearly dependent rows, nor the matrix of prior beliefs does have them.
For the case where agents types are from intervals the above technique
could not be applied anymore. Instead we employ the result from the dif-
ferential geometry the Whitney Embedding Theorem. The Whitney Em-
bedding Theorem states that in the space of all (continuously di¤erentiable)
mappings from a low dimensional space into some space of a higher dimen-
sion (which should be no less than twice as large than the support space)
injective mappings constitute an open and dense set, i.e. they are generic.
Because each agents beliefs about others types is a projection from a space
of a dimension equal to the number of his types, i.e. signals into a space
which has dimensionality of the sum of dimensions of the types of all other
agents, provided that these dimensions satisfy the Theorem requirement, we
obtain the result. That is generic interim beliefs that an agent could have
about types of all others are injective mappings. As for each dimension in-
terim beliefs are linear in the prior, it means that generic priors induce beliefs
which are fully informative about the signals on which they are conditioned.
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Chapter III
In this chapter we demonstrate that in general a set of social choice func-
tions which are implementable in a given set of types from the payo¤-based
universal type space is a strict subset of the set of social choice functions
implementable on explicit models of information having the same payo¤s
and beliefs hierarchies as in that subset of types of the universal type space.
Our proof is constructive we describe an environment and a social choice
function where this result holds.
The existing game theoretic and mechanism design literature has widely
adopted the payo¤-based universal type space construction because any
given model of private information could be represented by some set of
types in the payo¤-based universal type space. However it could happen
that a given subset of types from the payo¤-based universal type space may
be represented by several di¤erent strategic models. And so restricting at-
tention to the payo¤-based hierarchies of beliefs is without loss of generality
only if the predictions of behaviour of types from the universal type space
do not vary along the models that may be used to represent that given set
of types. Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)
have demonstrated in a game-theoretic setting that predictions on a set of
rationalizable strategies depend on the details of the model that is used to
construct belief hierarchies about payo¤s.
In our paper we verify the sensitivity of the mechanism design analysis
to details of a particular specication of a type space. We show that indeed
if some social choice function is not implementable on a given subset of
types from the payo¤-based universal type space, it does not mean that it is
not implementable on other type spaces, accounting explicitly for correlated
information, even though agents have the same payo¤-based hierarchies of
beliefs as in that subset of types from the universal type space.
The intuition behind this result is due to the fact that there may happen
jamming of information on the way of transition from a specic model of
information, i.e. a model which is explicit about agents payo¤s and signals,
to a set of types from the payo¤-based universal type space where only belief
hierarchies about the cross sectional distribution of payo¤s are specied. By
modeling only "terminal" hierarchies of beliefs about payo¤s and not look-
ing at the details of a model that gives rise to these hierarchies we naturally
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may lose at least two types of information information about agents condi-
tional beliefs about others signals and values of signals themselves. Whereas
conditioning agentsallocations on reports about this type of information
may allow to relax incentive compatibility constraints and thus to achieve a
broader set of allocations.
We conclude this paper with a discussion on when actually restricting
attention to payo¤-based hierarchies of beliefs does not entail a loss of gen-
erality. Obviously it is true when by knowing agents belief hierarchies about
payo¤s we have as much information as if we had known their payo¤s, sig-
nals and beliefs about those. We discuss when this is likely to happen and
it seems that it is likely to be true under the assumption of common priors
and it is quite unlikely to be true when we cannot assume that agents priors
are known, i.e. they should also constitute their private information from
the very beginning.
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Chapter 1
Endogenous Trade
Enforcement Institutions
Abstract1 A large population of agents heterogenous in strength endow-
ments match one-shot to trade with each other. Two competing contract
enforcement institutions are available to the population: a costless but asym-
metric that imposes a punishment for cheating on weak agents but not on
strong ones and a symmetric institution that imposes punishment for cheat-
ing independently of agents identities but which requires a collective invest-
ment into its capacity up-front. The paper shows: (i) Sometimes strong
agents receive rents under the asymmetric system, but sometimes these are
the weak who benet from it; (ii) There exists an equilibrium where all
agents, independently of their strength, pay to the xed cost of the symmet-
ric system provided it excludes non-contributors from enforcement of their
contracts with contributors; (iii) The rate of cheating is always positive in
contracts subject to asymmetric punishment and it is zero in contracts sub-
ject to impartial punishment.
1 I am specically grateful to Martin Hellwig for all patient and rich in ideas discussions
of this research. I also would like to thank for helpful comments Avinash Dixit, Bruno
Jullien, Elena Panova, Emanuele Tarantino, Eugenia Winschel. Questions from the audi-
ences of ESNIE 2006, EEA 2007, ASSET 2007, AEA 2008 meetings and Universities of
Mannheim and Toulouse were helpful to shape ideas better.
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1.1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Most of exchanges, while being mutually benecial, are vulnerable to op-
portunistic behaviour of the trading agents themselves. When damaging
behaviour from an encounter is to be expected, agents may decide not to
start any trade at all at the rst place. Hence, unless some punishment for
misbehaviour is available to agents, the level of economic activity is likely
to be ine¢ ciently low.
When agents are able to have repeated economic interactions, in most
cases reputational concerns help to enforce mutually benecial behaviour
within a trade. However when the size of a market grows, the reputation-
based governance usually does not work well any longer. Instead, a rule-
based third party governance is to be introduced (Dixit (2003b)). But in
a large economy an e¢ cient third party enforcement institution is likely to
require an investment into its capacity up-front (Li (2000)). One should
cover e¢ ciency wage of enforcement agents, expenses on data-bases on
previous cheating, investment into design of the e¢ cient and up-to-date laws
and codes, etc. Moreover as these features are likely to be complementary,
failure to cover a part of these costs may result in dysfunctionalities, in
other words all expenses sum up into a xed cost of the e¢ cient contract
enforcement system.
This paper studies how an e¢ cient contract enforcement system2, which
requires a xed cost3 to be covered, could collect these resources when it
competes with an alternative, second-best contract enforcement systems.
The e¢ cient system is able to enforce trade agreements awlessly (it will
be called the symmetric punishment system, or SPS, for short). Whereas
under governance of the second best system some agents are more likely to
obtain justice than others if they have a higher resources endowment. In
a match of two agents such that agent i is stronger, i.e. it has a higher
endowment than agent j; agent i is able to punish dishonest behaviour of
j: While if i cheats on j, j having less resources than i is not able to get
2 In this paper I am concerned only with contract rights, i.e. I do not consider issues
of thieft or extortion (i.e. violation of property rights).
3This cost is necessary to weaken all possible informational and cognitive constraints
observable in reality. Paying higher e¢ ciency wageto enforcers to make them immune
to bribes or hiring enough of investigators to nd for sure the true state of things would
always improve the quality of enforcement.
2
1.1. INTRODUCTION
compensation from i: In other words, j is "weak. The relative advantage
of this system is that it functions at zero costs to agents4. It is called the
asymmetric punishment system(APS).
Then the precise question of this paper is:
 Does there exist a contribution mechanism which would allow the sym-
metric punishment system to collect resources to its xed cost given
that each agent could enforce his contracts alternatively through the
costless but asymmetric system?
But to answer this question, one should understand several preliminary
issues: When the symmetric punishment system is not available, who ben-
ets from contracting under the APS? How valuations for the SPS and the
APS are distributed in the economy depending on gains from trade, gains
from cheating and the distribution of endowments?
Answering to preliminary questions and looking closer at the function-
ing of the second best system may be of its own interest, as in the reality
one observes such type of enforcement systems quite often. Many develop-
ing countries have rather asymmetric o¢ cial legal systems. For example,
in India only relatively resourceful agents are able to obtain justice (The
Economist, December 26, 2006 provides examples of this). The developed
countries do not necessarily have the rst best system either. The importance
of resources for performance within the American legal system is discussed,
for example, in Galanter (1978)5. He theorized on di¤erent dimensions of
strength bringing advantages to the haves over the have-nots within
the American legal process (legal experience, nancial resources and politi-
cal power a¤ect positively and non-negligibly the probability of winning the
case6).
4The zero marginal cost of the APS can easily be justied if one accepts that the sector
contains at least two service providers and they compete in prices. Introduction of any
non-zero xed cost for the APS does not provide qualitative changes, as what matters for
the results are the relative xed costs of two punishment systems.
5For another example of the importance of resources in the Italian courts see Enriques
(2002).
6His analysis has provoked a number of subsequent studies aiming to prove or disprove,
in a quantied way, the role of the resource factor in the probability of winning in courts.
Lempert (1999) reviews many such studies and makes a sharper statement that it is polit-
ical power and nancial means that are more relevant for litigantsperformance in courts.
3
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Failure to be impartial happens to private enforcers as well. Several case
studies by Hill (2003) and Hill (2006) of Japanese Yakuza demonstrate that
often the winningparty of a trade dispute is the one who is able to hire the
strongest gang who arguably charges a higher price for its services (Yakuza
services are sought to enforce bankruptcy law, to recollect debts in gen-
eral or to enforce anti-competitive agreements among colluding companies).
The study of the Italian Maa by Gambetta (1997) (theorized later by Dixit
(2003a)) makes a similar case that incentives for impartiality of Maa en-
forcers are costly.
It is surprising is that despite of the apparent ine¢ ciency of the partial
systems the demand for their services does not seem to vanish completely.
Ine¢ cient legal systems are still in place and impersonal markets under
those systems do not disappear. Similarly, demand for services of Yakuza
is non-negligible even by the least empowered agents (Hill (2006)). While
answering to the preliminary questions outlined above this paper highlights
some of the reasons for this phenomenon.
There are several remarks on modelling. I study in a detailed way only
the demand side of the market for enforcement services and do not consider
micro-foundations of the enforcement system, e.g. incentives of enforcers.
Similarly to Dixit (2003a), a transaction where each agent has an opportu-
nity to prot at the expense of his trading partner is modelled by a two-sided
prisoners dilemma game. That is, agents could exchange goods or services,
or produce something together, but receiving a positive benet from a trans-
action by both agents is conditional on both agents behaving cooperatively7.
As experienceor technicity of issuesare matters that could be overcome via the em-
ployment of top lawyers and technical experts. Sheehan and Songer (1992) quantitatively
prove the presence of advantages of the haves in the United States Courts of Appeal.
They show that the Federal Government is likely to win against local governments, big
rms perform better than small rms, any government performs better than a rm, any
individual is less likely to win than any rm, and any minority group individual or a per-
son from the bottom of the income distribution is less likely to win than the government,
a rm and any other non-minority or a relatively well-to-do individual.
7There are many possible examples of opportunism within bilateral contracting: a
buyer cannot observe immediately the quality of the good proposed by the seller, and if
the latter provides him with a lemon he cannot reject it at the moment of the exchange
(and by doing this provide correct incentives to the seller ex ante); the buyer himself could
renege on the payment if, for example, it is to be done in a while. Essentially, for any
transaction nowadays if there is a contract, it means there is a scope for one-sided or
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If both agents misbehave at the same time, the value of the exchange is the
lowest.
The analysis of the preliminary questions gives following results. When
applied asymmetrically punishment is of intermediate severity, any APS is
benecial to every agent, even the weakest one, as compared to the world
with no punishment at all. In this case everyone participates in the mar-
ket and applies for enforcement services to the APS. This system insures a
strictly positive rate of equilibrium honest behaviour but it is never able to
eliminate cheating fully by varying the level of imposed punishment. The
reason for this is that contracting on the market can breakdown completely
if the applied punishment is too low or too high, as stakes of cheating be-
come in both cases important, agents prefer to cheat and so expected gain
from trade on the market is lower than from not trading at all. By contrast,
in the system with symmetrically imposed punishment, the rate of cheating
under a wide range of the parameters is zero. In this case everyone prefers
to enter the market and trade rather than stay outside. But two systems
cannot be Pareto ranking between themselves at the intermediate values of
punishment. As if punishment is moderately high, the strong agents obtain
rents from trade under asymmetric governance relative to the symmetric one
and prefer this to be the only mode for everyone. If punishment is moder-
ately low, these are the weak who obtain rents under the APS as compared
to the SPS. These results are independent of the shape of a distribution of
endowments in the economy.
Now some remarks should be made before giving answers to the main
question of the paper. One could recognize that the SPS possesses properties
of an excludable public good: it is non-rival (in equilibrium it is only a
threat as no one cheats, hence no one uses its services, although it should be
still a credible option) and it is technically possible to exclude agents from
enforcement of their contracts. Hence the problem of symmetric punishment
system is the problem of a monopolistic provider of an excludable public
good with one caveat that in case of the punishment system the exclusion
is naturally two-dimensional. Each agent could be excluded from both ability
to punish and from ability to be punished. So exclusion could be partial
when agents are excluded only from a possibility to punish their encounters;
fullwhen agents are excluded from both, a possibility to punish their
mutual misbehaviour that this contract aims to prevent.
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encounters and possibility of being punished by them; and nally what I call
quasi-nonewhen both agents are allowed to punish each other, provided
that at least one of them is admitted to the symmetric system.
The main result for the contribution game is that when the applied
exclusion rule is su¢ ciently severe (i.e. it is either partial or full, but
not quasi-none), there exists an equilibrium in which all agents, even the
strong, who prefer asymmetric governance to be the only mode available to
everyone, subscribe for the services of the symmetric punishment system.
That is the SPS is able to crowd the APS fully out of the market. The
intuition is when all other agents are under protection of the SPS the strong
agents can no longer expect any rents to their strength if the exclusion is
partial. In case of full exclusion no one would wish to trade with the strong
altogether, as they are excluded from ability to punish and ability to be
punished and so the only equilibrium behaviour within contract is mutual
cheating. That is why, unless the strong submit themselves under the order
of the SPS as well, their perspectives are rather poor8. Whereas by paying to
the SPS the strong agents commit themselves to be subject to punishment,
to avoid mutual cheating and so to become attractive to others to do trade
with them.
However the full subscription is not the only possible outcome, as the
analysis demonstrates, a decentralized competition between two system could
bring equilibria where the social welfare could be quite low because a costly
SPS attracts only a fraction of agents who over-pay for its services whereas
another fraction of agents remains under the APS and so two systems ine¢ -
ciently coexist. This happens because agents valuations for each of systems
are interdependent and the more sever is the exclusion rule that the sym-
metric system applies the higher is interdependence.
The related literature belongs to two di¤erent streams. First, it is re-
search on institutions governing economic transactions, especially Dixit (2004).
However Dixit (2004) does not cover explicitly the issue of competing third-
party enforcement institutions one of which has to collect resources for its
up-front xed cost to provide a quality service. Another stream of related
8This result is reminiscent of Hobbes (1651) and Rousseau (1762). Individuals are
willing to conclude a "social contract" with a third-party on their protection against
otherscheating and in return a third party is allowed to take them liable for their own
misbehaviour with respect to the others.
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literature corresponds to the optimal design of public good provision mech-
anisms in a large population of agents. Specically Hellwig (2003), Hellwig
(2007), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Norman (2004) provide a related
analysis. Given that the type of the problem studied here is a particular one,
namely exclusion from punishment is inherently two-dimensional, it makes
the results available in the literature for public goods provision not to be
directly applicable.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section studies individual
behaviour and resulting payo¤s under two punishment systems. Section 3
gives the results of the subscription game proposed by the SPS and discusses
welfare implications. Section 4 contains some extensions, in particular, when
the APS has a monopolistic positive pricing for its services. Section 5 con-
cludes.
1.2 Transactions under Di¤erent GovernanceModes
1.2.1 Bilateral transactions without any governance
An economy consists of a continuum of agents of mass 1. Agents match
in pairs one-shot to trade with each other on some markets and as it was
justied already in the introduction, each game, played bilaterally, has the
strategic properties of the prisoners dilemma game.
The next matrix presents a simple symmetric version of this strategic
situation. H stands for playing honestand C for cheatingbehaviour:
H C
H 1; 1 1  ; 1 + 
C 1 + ; 1   0; 0
(1.1)
Here  is the stake of cheating and it is such that  > 1. The only
equilibrium strategy here is to misbehave for both agents.
1.2.2 Punishment
Under asymmetric governance agents are heterogenous in ability to punish
dishonest behaviour of their encounters. This is captured by the parameter
 which is distributed in the population according to a continuous cdf F ()
with a support
h
; 
i
;    > 0. If an agent i matches with an agent j such
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that the realization of types is i > j , an agent i is called the strong (he
has  =  within the match), he is able to punish for sure the deviation of
j, if it occurs. Agent j is then the weak (he has  =  within the match)
and if the strong agent cheats him, by contrast, he is not able to obtain a
compensation.
The payo¤ matrix of the transaction is as follows, the row agent is the
strong and the column agent is the weak:
strongnweak H C
H 1; 1 1   + ; 1 +    
C 1 + ; 1   0; 0
: (1.2)
The parameter  reects the e¤ective level of punishment9 imposed on
a cheating player10. This parameter may be though about as an expected
punishment, i.e., it may be a probabilistically imposed punishment, where
only with some probability  (0    1) some ne R is imposed. Proba-
bility  would reect the general quality of asymmetric punishment system
whereas R could reect a statutory amount of punishment. Thus one has
 = R; though given that  and R are not to be taken as endogenous
choices without any loss the analysis will be given directly for  and it will
be referred to both as punishment and e¢ ciency of enforcement system.
Note that neither player can be punished if both agents have deviated,
i.e. if the state fC;Cg has occurred. This assumption can be justied
by resource constraint of agents (e.g. when nothing is produced together,
nothing can be taken from each other).
9 I incorporate directly the punishment into the payo¤ matrix, although there is cer-
tainly some multistage negotiation/litigation process behind. Once there is a complete
information about the individual behaviour within a transaction, taking the reduced form
of a dynamic bargaining model is w.l.o.g.
10This parameter may consist of several parts in reality, for example it may be a proba-
bilistically imposed punishment, where only with some probability  (0    1) a ne R
is imposed. Probability  may reect the general quality of asymmetric punishment sys-
tem whereas R could reect, for example, discretion at which the punishment is imposed
(as R can be higher or lower than the cheating stake ). Then  can be thought about
as  = R: However, under assumption of complete information among all agents about
types and given that  and R are not going to be endogenized in this model, it is also
without any loss that one can analyze directly for .
8
1.2. TRANSACTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE MODES
Both agents observe each others type at the moment of match and prior
to the choice of their optimal strategies within a transaction.
Hence, potentially, every agent can be in one of two possible games:
where he is strong and where he is weak. The ex ante probability (prior to
the realization of matching uncertainty) to be in either game is coming from
agentstype : The higher is i; the more agent i is likely to be in the game
where he is strong as the probability to be of a higher type than agent j is
given by F () = Fj(i) = Pr(j < i) =
R i
 dFj():
I assume that the service of asymmetrically imposed punishment does
not cost anything to any agent11. I discuss in the section 4 the results when
there is a monopolistic provider of the asymmetric punishment services who
makes take-it-or-leave-it pricing o¤ers.
As for the symmetric governance system, by denition, it is able to pun-
ish cheating of any agent, independently of his whatsoever identity. The
payo¤s matrix for a match is then:
strongnweak H C
H 1; 1 1   + ; 1 +    
C 1 +    ; 1   +  0; 0
(1.3)
Again, as in the previous case, I assume that if both agents cheat on each
other there is no way to punish both of them simultaneously. The xed cost
of this system is equal to K:
In the following section I give results on the equilibrium strategies chosen
by agents under each governance mode depending on their type .
1.2.3 Individual Behaviour under Two Punishment Modes
Equilibrium Payo¤s from Transactions under Asymmetric Punish-
ment
Suppose only the system with asymmetrically imposed punishment is avail-
able to everyone. Agent i plays H with probability i(H) and C with the
complementary probability i(C) = 1  i(H): Exploring the matrix (2) one
11The reason of why I assume away all cost considerations is to distill out the net impact
of asymmetrically imposed punishment on agents utility.
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can see there are three possible types of equilibria, depending on the values
of the parameters:
Case :  < 
Under such constellation, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the
game specied in (1.2). The equilibrium mixed strategies are:
i(fHg ; ) =
1   + 
1 + 
; i(fCg ; ) =

1 + 
(1.4)
for the behaviour of an agent i when he is weak.
And when agent i is the strong type:
i(fHg ; ) =
   1
  1 ; i(fCg ; ) =
  
  1 : (1.5)
The punishment and the deviation stake have opposite e¤ects on proba-
bility of honest behaviour from the strong and from the weak. The higher
is ; the more honestly behaves the weak and the less honestly behaves the
strong. The higher is  the more honest behaviour comes from the strong
and the less comes from the weak. As  !  an agent who is the strong
behaves honestly with probability going to 1. But such  deteriorates the
incentives of the weak agent to behave honestly.
Corresponding utilities to be the weak and to be the strong are:
EUA() = (1 +    )    1
  1 (1.6)
EUA() = (1 + )
1   + 
1 + 
(1.7)
Thus, any agent of type  has an expected utility from entry in to the
market, before learning the type of his match:
EUA() = F ()  EUA() + (1  F ())  EUA() (1.8)
= F ()  (EUA()  EUA()) + EUA()
= F ()  2( )
(2 1) + (1 +    )  1 1
The expected utility is strictly increasing in  as  >  > 1:
Case:    1 <  < 
10
1.2. TRANSACTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE MODES
In this case the unique, pure strategies equilibrium is
(i(fHg ; ); j(fHg ; )) = (1; 0):
That is an agent who is the strong behaves honestly but the weak agent
always cheats. It seems to be counterintuitive, but given the results above
(see (1.4) and (1.5)) it is logical. The punishment becomes too low so the
weak agents have incentives only to cheat, but the strong still prefer rather
to behave honestly in order to be cheated and receive as a compensation at
least a fraction of the trade benet. This strategy yet provides him a non-
zero utility (= 1  +  > 0) as compared to the strategy where they would
be cheating too and everyone would obtain zero payo¤.
The expected utility from entering into the market is
EUA() = 1 + (1  2F ())(   ) (1.9)
It is decreasing with :
Case:  <    1
Here, the punishment is so low that it does not preclude any misbe-
haviour from either agent and in particular it can no longer compensate
the strong for their honest behaviour as it was in the previous case. So the
unique, pure strategies equilibrium is (i(fHg ; ); j(fHg ; )) = (0; 0). The
expected utility from participating in the market is EUA() = 0:
Hence one could see that the asymmetric punishment system improves
upon no punishment at all as the level of honest behaviour could be positive.
But the total gain of any agent i given i depends on the number of those
who participate in the market, as the next section demonstrates.
Entry into contracting under the APS
It is assumed that the initial decision to participate in the market is volun-
tary. Relatively weak agents are free not to enter into the market at all and
hence not to submit themselves under unpunished acts of the strong. Or
inversely, this may be the strong who would prefer not to deal with cheating
weak agents and so not to start any trade activity. Consequently one should
study the question how large is the demand for the APS services given the
11
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parameters of the model. This is dened by the gains relative to staying
outside of the market.
Assume that not participating at all in the market brings the utility
equal to zero to any agent12, independently of his . Because the expected
utility from participating in the market is increasing with type  when  >
, presumably the agents with low  would be rst who would prefer to
take rather outside opportunity. Similarly when  < , strong agents are
the rst who would stay outside of contracting. But it happens that non-
participation by a subgroup of agents has population-wide implications and
actually no agent at the end enters the market if for a subgroup of agents it
is not benecial. The following proposition provides with the details of this
result.
Proposition 1.1 There exist two levels of punishment min =    1 > 0
and max =  + 1 <1 such that:
- if  2 min; max the equilibrium payo¤s for all types under asymmet-
ric punishment are strictly greater than individual payo¤s for all types under
no punishment;
- if  =2 min; max equilibrium payo¤s are zero for all types, as they are
in the absence of punishment.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. But the intuition behind is when
the lowest agent loses from participating in the market, and so he does not
enter, the next to him agent does not have anymore any tiny chance to be
the strong, and at most he can be only the weakest one. So, being now
the lowest type, he strictly prefers not to enter either. And this process of
taking outside option will continue till the moment where the very last, the
strongest agent of the population remains alone, and so he does not enter
either. A similar unraveling happens if the punishment is too low and the
strongest agent has a negative utility from participating. This result has the
following implication:
Corollary 1.2 There is no  that would induce simultaneously both agents
to play honestly, i.e. in this system of asymmetric application of the punish-
12 I assume also that when agents expect an outcome fC;Cg to happen in the market
(which provides with payo¤ zero), they prefer rather to stay at home.
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ment  (> 0) the equilibrium (i(fHg ; ); j(fHg ; )) = (1; 1) is unachiev-
able.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Hence the main conclusion this section comes to is that a system with
asymmetric punishment, where only some agents deviations are punished,
could be still benecial individually and collectively as compared to a world
when no punishment for misbehaviour is available. But the functioning of
this system is quite fragile, as too large or too small amount of punish-
ment that it might impose could make it totally unattractive for any agent.
Of course this result of full unraveling was hinging on the assumption that
everyones outside option is equal to zero. For heterogenous or type de-
pendent outside payo¤s this result would be di¤erent and partial market
participation, by some groups of agents, would be yet possible.
Equilibrium Payo¤s from Transactions under Symmetric Punish-
ment
Analyzing the game in (1.3) one can see that the unique equilibrium when
the punishment is imposed symmetrically is to play honest for both agents
provided that  > : The resulting expected utility from the matching under
symmetric punishment is
EUS() = 1 (1.10)
for each : Consequently it is the way and not the amount of the pun-
ishment applied that allows to achieve an equilibrium in which both agents
would behave honestly.
Note, there is a uniform gain for everyone from installation of the sym-
metric punishment when the only alternative regime is to trade under no
punishment at all, i.e. not to trade at all.
Comparing the Payo¤s under Di¤erent Punishment Modes
One can observe that switching to a regime where for all agents only the
symmetric punishment system is available has distributional implications.
When  =2 min; max each agent, even the strongest one benets from
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appearance of the symmetric punishment system. When  2 [; max] rela-
tively weak agents prefer the symmetric punishment to be the only mode of
governance for everyone, because . When  2 min;  these are the strong
who prefer the symmetric governance to the asymmetric (this can be seen
comparing (1.8) and (1.10)).
On aggregate, when  =2 min; max and  2 [; max], the SPS brings
higher aggregated payo¤s than the APS.
In the remaining area of the parameters two systems are equivalent from
the social welfare perspective.
1.3 The Contribution Game
Agents strength types, and hence their true valuations for the SPS, are likely
to be unobservable at the ex ante stage, before they match with their trading
partners and when they have to subscribe either for the SPS or the APS.
Thus the entire analysis of optimal pricing for the symmetric services has
to take this constraint into account.
1.3.1 General Result for Provision of a Public Good under
Incomplete Information13
A general result in quasi-linear environments about pricing of a public good
under incomplete information about agentspreferences is that there is no
way to construct a game within a large population of agents where in equi-
librium each agent could be made paying according to his valuation.
Lemma 1.3 If agents type  is private information, in an economy with a
large number of agents, there is no way to install the symmetric punishment
via a contribution game with type dependent payments and achieve the rst
best allocation.
13Because utility is transferable across agents and installation of a system imposing
symmetric punishment increases the aggregate welfare when cost of the SPS is not too
high under complete information about agentstypes there exists a vector of side-transfers
among agents such that those who lose from introduction of the symmetric punishment
system are compensated. A social contract having this outcome could be implemented
via some multilateral bargaining procedure. But such payment scheme is obviously not
viable when information about every individuals type  is unobservable at the moment
when agents contribute to the xed cost.
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Proof. See proof to the proposition 2.3 in Hellwig (2007).
The lemma implies that there is no way to learn individual information
of agents by proposing a menu of incentive compatible, individually rational
and hence type-dependent contributions bound to di¤erentiated probabili-
ties of provision of a public good.
The intuition for this result is that in a large economy, no agent is pivotal.
It is known that in a quasi-linear14 environment the unique mechanism that
could collect type-dependent, incentive compatible contributions is Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG)15. It imposes a tax on each agent for his
report about his type. The tax is constructed in a way that it makes an
agent i pay to the rest of the group an amount of money equal to the sum
of changes in their utilities, with changes coming from the fact that there is
a change in the outcome once an agent i has reported his preferences. This
makes an agent i internalize fully the impact of his report on the rest of the
group and hence to be truthful. However such payment scheme in general
is not individually rational. Moreover as the number of agents grows, the
probability that any agents report about his preferences over a public good,
however big or however small it is, would have any impact on the probability
of provision of a public good is next to zero. Hence, the tax cannot vary
much either, nor can it, as a result, provide with the incentives to tell the
truth.
For a problem with non-excludable public goods it means that the prob-
ability of their voluntary provision in a large population is zero16. For a
problem with excludable public goods it means that the only feasible con-
tribution is a type-independent constant payment taking the form of an
admission ticket. Hence individual exclusion should be applied, even if it is
ine¢ cient given that the public good is on place17.
14And so it is in a linear environement, as here.
15The uniqueness of VCG for quasilinear environments was established by Green and
La¤ont (1979).
16More details on this result can be found in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
17There is an additional remark that should be made about feasibility of a voluntary
contribution scheme. Here I assume the cost of a public good is actually proportional to
the size of population (which is an innite number of agents of mass 1). Otherwise there
would be a scope for an incentive compatible provision of a public good via a voluntary
contributions scheme. As it is shown in Hellwig (2003), in a large population of agents, if
the cost of a public good is negligible compared to the size of the economy, provided that
the lowest possible valuation is at least just above zero, the public good can be provided
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That is why I in the following section I shall proceed for the analysis of
optimal uniform pricing of the services of the symmetric punishment system
which is, as justied in introduction, an excludable public good.
1.3.2 An Admission FeeMechanism for Provision of the Sym-
metric Punishment System
The admission fee mechanism is a direct mechanism. It stipulates the prob-
ability of provision of a public good, individual payments and probability of
individual admission to the public good given a prole of equilibrium reports
about valuation types (see for example Hellwig (2007) or Norman (2004)).
By contrast to a usual admission mechanism where admission probability
is one dimensional (stipulating probability of being allowed to enjoy a public
good) here one needs to stipulate a two-dimensional admission probability
because by the very nature of the punishment system agents can be excluded
via two channels. An agent can be excluded from a possibility to punish his
encounter (if the latter cheats him) and he can be excluded from a possibility
to be punished by an encounter whom he has cheated.
The formal denition of the admission fee mechanism for provision of
the symmetric punishment system is:
Definition 1.4 The admission fee mechanism to collect resources to cover
the cost of the SPS K is   = (; g()) where  = Qi2I i is a message
space of all agents and g() = (y; t; ) is the vector of outcome functions:
y :  ! [0; 1] probability of emergence of the symmetric punishment
system given the prole of agents messages;
t : ! <+ vector of individual contribution functions;
e : ! fn; p; fg exclusion rule (qualitative variable);
 :  ! [0; 1]  [0; 1] vector of individual admission probabilities for a
given exclusion rule.
Hence instead of stipulating a single valued probability of admission to
the symmetric punishment for given agents report, the mechanism should
with a non-zero probability. The intuition for this is that in such environment a per capita
contribution rate goes to zero and so agents can contribute indi¤erently the requested "
(equal to the lowest possbile valuation).
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stipulate the probability of admission to both possibilities, i.e. to punish and
to be punished. As the result, an agent i given his report about his type ei
could be excluded in three possible ways:
The full exclusion happens when agent is admitted to neither option
(i.e. he cannot punish and cannot be punished). In more details:
(1) when i is admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j
who is not admitted to the symmetric punishment, neither agent can punish
misbehaviour of his encounter;
(2) when i is admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j who
is admitted as well, either agent is punished in case he misbehaves;
(3) when i is not admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j
who is admitted, neither agent is punished for any misbehaviour;
(4) when i is not admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets
j who is not admitted to the symmetric punishment, both are to deal within
either asymmetric punishment system or none.
By contrast, the partial exclusion is applied when agent can punish
the encounters misbehaviour but cannot be punished for his own misbehav-
iour towards an encounter. In details:
(1) when i is admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j who
is not admitted to the symmetric punishment, i can punish misbehaviour of
j but agent j cannot punish misbehaviour of i if it occurs;
(2) when i is admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j who
is admitted as well, any agent is punished if he misbehaves;
(3) when i is not admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets
j who is admitted, i is punished for his misbehaviour, but agent j; if he
misbehaves towards i is not punished;
(4) when i is not admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets
j who is not admitted to the symmetric punishment, both agents are to deal
within either asymmetric punishment system or none.
The quasi-noneexclusion rule: where an agent who is not admit-
ted to the symmetric punishment can still punish and be punished by his
encounter if the latter is admitted:
(1) when i is admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j who
is not admitted to the symmetric punishment, i can punish misbehaviour of
17
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j and j can punish misbehaviour of i if it occurs;
(2) when i is admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j who
is admitted as well, both agents are punished in case when misbehaviour of
either occurs;
(3) when i is not admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets j
who is admitted, either agent is punished in case he misbehaves;
(4) when i is not admitted to the symmetric punishment and he meets
j who is not admitted to the symmetric punishment, both are to deal within
either asymmetric punishment system or none.
As the individual types are unobservable, by the revelation principle,
an allocation prescribed by the mechanism should be incentive compatible.
Denote each agent is reporting strategy as ei :  ! ; if agent reports
truthfully I denote his chosen report as i and if he mispresents as 
0
i: with
An allocation (y(e); (e); t(e) achievable in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
of the direct mechanism  () is incentive compatible if for each agent i the
following holds18:
EUPi (

i ; 

 i; y(); (); i)  t(i ;  i; y(); (); i) (1.11)
 EUP (0i;  i; y(); (); i)  t(0i;  i; y(); (); i) (1.12)
for a prole of truthful reports of  i :  i; types i; i 6= 0i and  i; and
under the realized punishment P 2 f0; A; Sg :
Given that each agent is free not to enter into contracting at all under
any governance mode, an allocation induced by the provision mechanism is
required to satisfy a contracting participation constraint:
EUPi (i; 

 i; y(); (); i)  t(i;  i; y(); (); i)  0 (1.13)
under the realized punishment P 2 f0; A; Sg :
Finally, the allocations should be compatible with the following budget
constraint:
18Thus, for a given exclusion rule, the admission probabilities vector for each individual
i contains two values i = (
p
i (); bpi ()) with pi being the probability that an agent i
can punish an agent j and bpi is the probability that an agent i can be punished by an
agent j: For a match of two agents obviously the following equalities should hold pi = 
bp
j
and bpi = 
p
j :
18
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Z
t=f:t()>0g
t()dF ()  K (1.14)
The entire timing concludes the description of the contribution game:
1. Nature distributes  among agents, every agent observes his i;
2. Agents decide on their most preferred punishment mode out of P 2
f0; A; Sg given K; ;  and  and expected payo¤s from entry into the
market under two di¤erent punishment modes;
3. A contribution mechanism to install the symmetric punishment stip-
ulating a set of admissible strategies and corresponding outcomes is
proposed19;
4. Each agent i accepts participation in the contribution mechanism or
not;
5. Those who accept play it, available punishment systems become known,
agents make their transaction under the most preferred available pun-
ishment mode and obtain the nal payo¤s.
1.3.3 Highest Revenue Equilibrium of the Admission Fee
Mechanism
In the following, I search for the optimal price t() depending on the pa-
rameters (; ) and the exclusion rule such that it results in the highest
collectible amount of resources for the SPS. As the cost K is exogenous, this
highest revenue gives the boundary on the exogenous K above which it is
not feasible to install the SPS. I evaluate how many agents subscribe for the
SPS in the equilibrium with the highest revenue.
I provide the results of the admission fee mechanism for two di¤erent
strategic situations. First, agents decide on contribution when the outside
opportunity is to trade under the APS. In the second they consider contri-
bution strategies when the outside option is no-punishment regime.
19The mechanism designer in this case may be the agents themselves.
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There are some simplifying shortcuts in the analysis. In the following,
I will restrict analysis only to the constellation  < ; i.e. where the asym-
metric system is su¢ ciently e¢ cient and able to withdraw at least the net
gain from cheating : The valuation for the regime where everyone trades
under symmetric punishment20 as compared to the regime where only the
asymmetric system is available, is monotonic in agents strength type when
 <  < +1 (it is decreasing in ); when  > +1 it is uniform in . Then,
given this, one could simplify the analysis of the optimal mechanism as it
would be natural to search for a threshold agent b such that only agents
below b are admitted to the symmetric punishment and are charged a user
fee t = KR b
 dF ()
:
In addition, I introduce another piece of notation: F (be): This term de-
notes the total number of agents who claim themselves in equilibrium to
be of type  < b for an announced threshold of the mechanism b: This is
needed because, when agents anticipate that a fraction of agents join the
SPS their valuation (willingness to pay to be admitted to the SPS) changes
depending on how big is the fraction of those whom they anticipate to join
the SPS. That is why the number of those who announce them to be of
"high valuation" ( < b) may be di¤erent from the actual cross-sectional
number of agents below21 b (which is then denoted F (b)).
Subscription when the APS is a viable outside option
The key result of the paper is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.5 The highest collectible amount of resources for the SPS
20To be precise on how is measured valuation for the symmetric punishment system
v(; y) = EUS()   EUP () for P 2 f0; Ag ; where EUP () denes expected utility from
the match under the alternative punishment system (asymmetric one or none). From
inspection of (1.8) one can see that the valuation depends on whether the asymmetric
punishment system is on place and how many other agents are admitted to it, as it
depends on probability to be strong or weak F () which in turn depends on decision
of the others to be under asymmetric punishment system. For  <  <  + 1 if the
asymmetric punishment system is active the higher is  the lower would be v(): When
there is no asymmetric punishment, individual valuation for the symmetric one is high for
all agents, independently of  and equal to 1 v() = EUS()  EUP () = 1  0 = 1)
21This implies implicitly that when agents mispresent their types they do so continu-
ously, i.e. there is no holes in an interval of types who mispresent their preferences.
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and corresponding rate of subscription depending on the exclusion rule are
as follows:
 Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = 1 and the rate of subsciption is 1 when the
exclusion rule is full;
 Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = 1 EUA() and the rate of subscription is
1 when the exclusion rule is partial;
 Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = 14(1 EUA()) and the rate of subscription
is 12 when the exclusion rule is quasi-no exclusion.
Here
R
t=f:t()>0g t
()dF () denotes equilibrium aggregate amount of
contributions. Feasibility of the SPS is then dened whether actual cost K
is below or above this amount.
Proof. For each case I will consider incentives of one agents to subscribe
for the SPS, given his type ; when all the remaining agents subscribe (i.e.
they claim valuations to be  < b). In particular I search what is the highest
payment t that the remaining agent would agree to pay.
1. For the full exclusion rule this constraint is: F (eb)  1   t  0, hence
when F (eb) = 1; t  1: That is why Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = 1:
2. For the partial exclusion rule, similarly: F (eb) 1+(1 F (eb))EUA() 
t  EUA(), and so when F (eb) = 1 any t  1 EUA() is individually ra-
tional. The maximum of aggregate resources then
R
t=f:t()>0g t
()dF () =
1  EUA():
3. For the quasi-no exclusion rule the threshold maximizing collectible
resources is at the intermediate values of F (eb). Namely, an agent indi¤erent
between joining the SPS and staying outside is dened by 1   t = F (eb) +
(1 F (eb))EUA(): This in turn gives F (eb) = 1 EUA() t
1 EUA() : The total amount
t  1 EUA() t
1 EUA() is at maximum when t =
1 EUA()
2 : Substituting into F (
eb)
gives 1=2 participation rate result.
Hence, under two out of three exclusion rules, the admission fee game
has one of equilibria where the SPS is provided with probability one and
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all agents, even strong, who prefer to live in a world where only the APS is
available for everyone, contribute to its cost.
The reason for this is the SPS treats those who have not contributed
to its xed costs either as weaks(under the partial exclusion rule) or as
nothing (under the full exclusion rule). By denition of the SPS, those
who sign up for the SPSs protection are strongerthan agents with a very
high  but who remain under the APS. So the previously strong agents have
no chances to obtain associated rents if all the others are under the SPS and
this induces them to subscribe for the SPS as well. Both, the assumption of
feasibility to exclude those who do not subscribe and the assumption that
the SPS can always impose punishment on agents under the APS are crucial
for the results.
By contrast, when the rule is quasi-no exclusion, an equilibrium with the
full rate of subscription is impossible. This is because if too many agents are
under the SPS, the remaining agents match them with a high probability
and obtain the full protection without paying anything to the xed cost of
the SPS. This dilutes their own incentives to contribute and they prefer to
free-ride.
Subscription when the APS is valueless
Recall from the section 2 that when  =2 [   1;  + 1] no one wishes to trade
under the APS. Hence the valuation for the SPS is uniformly equal to 1, even
for the strong agents as they cannot benet from their strength anyhow.
Consequently, within the admission fee game agents can be asked a sim-
ple message, say from f0; 1g : If agent says 0 he is excluded. If he says 1 he
is admitted and when he matches those who are excluded, their trades are
governed according to the exclusion rule in vigour.
The main results, depending on the exclusion rule, are:
Proposition 1.6 The highest collectible amount of resources for the SPS
and corresponding rate of subscription depending on the exclusion rule are:
 Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = 1 and the subscription rate is full when the
exclusion rule is full;
 Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = EUA()24(EUA() EUA() 1) and the subsciption rate
is
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min
n
EUA()
2(EUA() EUA() 1) ; 1
o
if the exclusion rule is partial;
 Rt=f:t()>0g t()dF () = 14 and the subscription rate is 12 when the
exclusion rule is quasi-no exclusion.
Proof. Suppose there is a subset of agents ( i), call it S i of a mass
F (S i) 2 [0; 1] ; who subscribe for the services of the symmetric punishment
system.
Under the full exclusion rule, agent i0s best reply would be to subscribe
as well if 1   t > 0: Moreover as long as t < 1 subscription is a (weak)
dominant strategy. Hence for any K  1 the symmetric punishment is
provided with probability one.
Under the partial exclusion rule, for a given t agent i is indi¤erent be-
tween subscribing and not when the fraction F (S i);dened below, sub-
scribes22:
F (S i)  1 + (1  F (S i))  EUA()  t  F (S i)  EUA() (1.15)
This gives F (S i)  EU
A() t
EUA()+EUA() 1 and the aggregate incentive com-
patible resources t  ( EUA() t
EUA()+EUA() 1): Maximizing this with respect to t
and substituting back brings the equilibrium F (S i) at which is the collected
resources are at maximum.
Under the quasi-no exclusion rule, an agent indi¤erent between two
regimes is 1   t  F (S i)  1: Proceeding as in the case with the partial
exclusion one obtains the results.
Compared to the previous subsection, under the partial exclusion rule
there may be no longer the full rate of participation as agents have incentives
to free-ride on those who have subscribed for the symmetric punishment.
By contrast under the quasi-no exclusion rule agents have less incentives to
free-ride compared to the previous section, i.e. a collectable revenue here is
higher. Finally, the full exclusion guarantees the rst best e¢ ciency result
22One should not be surprised by seeing utilites of the strong and the weak. The partial
exclusion by SPS has exactly the same strategic impact on agents behaviour in mixed
matches (i.e. of those who are admitted and those who are not) as APS has for strongs
and weaks.
23
1.3. THE CONTRIBUTION GAME
because joining the SPS is a dominant strategy for any agent under this
rule.
The most important conclusion of this section is that by excluding from
protection (to di¤erent degrees) the SPS could induce even the strongest
agent to contribute to its cost. This is because in order to obtain a gain from
economic activity both agents should play honest and for any constellation of
parameters for this both agents should have behind a threat of punishment.
1.3.4 Boundaries of E¢ ciency of the Subscription Game and
other Possible Equilibria
In this subsection I describe the sets of possible equilibria when agents
subscribe in a decentralized manner for the symmetric punishment. And
because di¤erent equilibria bring about di¤erent individual and aggregate
welfare, for each type of exclusion rule I dene the lowest social welfare.
The results of this section are given in order to discuss possible reasons
why in reality two punishment systems may coexist and to stress the un-
derlying coordination issue. As it is known from the literature on unique
implementation (e.g. Repullo (1992), Palfrey (1992)) undesirable equilibria
usually may be rather easily dispensed with through some extended indirect
mechanisms (though those may be by quite unnatural). So the primary goal
of this section is only to demonstrate that a market for enforcement services
does not have a built-in mechanism to regulate itself for e¢ cient pricing and
quality of services. A SPS which has a too high start-up cost could yet arise
and make everyone pay to its xed cost. Similarly, there are also situations
in which a SPS which has a small xed cost could yet fail to attract enough
of demand and even if there is a huge social welfare gain from a switch to
regime where only the symmetric system is available for everyone this is not
guaranteed to happen in equilibrium.
Then, the rst observation is that sometimes it is preferable not to have
the SPS when its cost is too high relative to the social gain when it is
available.
Proposition 1.7 There exists a threshold level of the cost K(; ) such that
if the actual cost of the SPS is above K(; ); the aggregate welfare is higher
when this system is not in place.
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The formal proof of this in the appendix. The next observation is
straightforward from the previous proposition.
Proposition 1.8 In any constellation of (; ), as long as K < K the social
welfare is lower when two punishment modes, the asymmetric and symmetric
one, coexist in equilibrium as compared to the social welfare when only the
symmetric punishment regime is available.
The proof is rather trivial and omitted (a sum of payo¤s from APS and
SPS (i.e. when some agents are under the SPS and some under the APS) is
inferior to the aggregate of payo¤s when everyone is under SPS).
Given these two propositions I shall check if there are equilibria where
the cost of the SPS is covered even if it is too high and whether there
exist equilibria where two punishment system coexist despite of apparent
ine¢ ciency of such outcome.
The set of equilibria under the partial exclusion rule:
It happens that under the partial exclusion rule, for each stipulated ad-
mission threshold b there could arise a continuum of subscription equilib-
ria. The main reason for this is that the subscription strategies are strategic
complements. So naturally of this there are multiple equilibria and actual
outcome depends on beliefs agents share about the subscription behaviour
in the population.
Proposition 1.9 In the admission fee game based on the partial exclusion
rule, for a given K 2 (0; 1  EU()) each threshold b posted by the SPS
induces three possible types of equilibria:
(1) a separating equilibrium where for a given threshold b agents report
their strength types truthfully  and hence all agents  < b are admitted to
the symmetric punishment and all agents  > b remain under asymmetric;
(2) a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria where for a given b; the actual
rate of subscription is dened by some agent eb 2 hb; i such that all agents
with  2
b;eb claim to be  < b so are admitted to the SPS; the remaining
enforce their contracts under the APS;
(3) two fully pooling equilibria where all agents report either their types
to be  > b; i.e. the subscription rate is zero, or  < b, i.e. everyone
subscribes for the SPS.
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The results of the proposition are illustrated in the following Figure:
The grey area on the picture is for the set of semi-pooling subscription
equilibria for a given level of the cost K; y = 1; the bold concave line gives
the separating equilibrium for a given cost K; y = 1; in the white area
y = 0 (as the number of those who subscribe and pay the corresponding t
is not enough to cover the cost K)
This picture essentially shows the following. Take any cost K < 1  
EUA() and stipulate an incentive compatible admission threshold b; then
the number of agents who in equilibrium could claim high valuation ( < b)
ranges from F (eb) = F (b) till F (eb) = 1, i.e. anything in between could be
an equilibrium. If all agents believe that everyone believes that a fraction
F (
be) > F (b) would claim high valuation and subscribe for symmetric gov-
ernance, for each single agent with be >  > b it is protable to subscribe
for the symmetric punishment as well (provided F (be)  t(be)  K; i.e. the
symmetric punishment system is commonly expected to be in place). The
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opposite holds as well, if an agent from
b;be believes that everyone else
in
b;be remains to trade under the APS, for him it is optimal not to join
the SPS either.
This strategic pattern leads to the following evaluation of the ine¢ ciency:
Proposition 1.10 There exists a level of cost bKPE with bKPE > K; such
that under the partial exclusion rule, for K 2
h
K; bKPEi the symmetric
punishment is installed, even though it is welfare decreasing.
The proof is rather straightforward. Consider an equilibrium where the
entire population subscribes (for a given cost K ine¢ ciency even higher
when a fraction of agents remain under the APS while the costly SPS is on
place). In equilibrium where everyone subscribes agents are insensitive to
the actual level of contribution t provided t  1   EUA() as everyones
behaviour depends only on beliefs. Then, even if the actual cost is K =
1   EUA()  bKPE agent i subscribes and pays t = 1   EUA() if he
believes all others are under protection of the SPS. The highest potential
e¢ ciency loss due to over-provision is then equal to bKPE K = ( )
2 1 > 0
as  > : This number is equal to the aggregated surplus from trade that
the SPS could extract from agents under the partial exclusion rule.
To summarize, the decentralized play of the contribution game may re-
sult in two types of ine¢ ciencies: 1. The SPS and APS may coexist in
equilibrium, i.e. di¤erent groups of agents use di¤erent systems and 2. The
SPS may be able to collect money for its cost K even when it is too costly
to have it or, in contrast, it may not able to do it even when it is e¢ cient
to have this system.
Equilibria under full exclusion rule:
The full exclusion rule as well has a continuum of subscription equilibria.
Proposition 1.11 In the admission fee game based on the full exclusion
rule, for a given K 2 (0; 1) ; each threshold b induces three possible types of
equilibria:
(1) a separating equilibrium where for a given threshold b agents report
truthfully their type , all agents  < b are admitted to the symmetric pun-
ishment and all agents  > b remain under asymmetric;
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(2) a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria where for a given b; the actual
rate of subscription is dened by some eb 2 hb; i such that all agents with
 2
b;eb claim to be  < b so are admitted to the SPS; the remaining
enforce their contracts under the APS;
(3) two fully pooling equilibria where all agents report either their types
to be  > b; i.e. the subscription rate is zero, or  < b, i.e. everyone
subscribes for the SPS.
The proof is in the Appendix. Note that the previous section has de-
scribed exactly one of two equilibria from (3) type.
The sets of equilibria under full exclusion rule for each K are depicted
on the following gure:
The bold line denes the separating equilibrium for each given K. The
grey area corresponds to the set of semi-pooling equilibria (dened by F (be))
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for each level of the cost K, Fmin(
be) is the minimal critical mass of agents to
whom it is protable to subscribe (given agents believe that at least fraction
Fmin(
be) subscribe).
Contrary to the previous case, with the partial exclusion rule, each is
beliefs about the subsciption behaviour should be su¢ ciently optimistic for
him to join the SPS. That is each agent should believe that there is at
least some minimal number (a critical mass ) of agents who are under
protection by the SPS. The reason for this threshold is as follows. Under
the full exclusion rule, if there are too few people who are under the SPS, it
is with a high probability that an agent who joins the SPS meets the one who
is under the APS. In this case, according to the full exclusion rule on neither
agent is imposed any punishment. Consequently the only payo¤s that both
agents can expect are zero. Anticipating this, if an agent believes that only
few of others subscribe, he prefers to remain under the APS which gives
him a higher expected utility. The opposite holds as well. If many agents
join the SPS, for the remaining agents the utility from joining it higher than
not doing it because with a very high probability agents outside of the SPS
will meet the insiders and will not trade with them because of absence of
any punishment. The highest collectible amount of resources is the higher
under the full exclusion rule (= 1) as compared to the partial exclusion rule
(= 1  EUA()).
One can see that the coexistence of two modes in equilibrium is possible
under the full exclusion rule too. And similarly to the case with the partial
exclusion rule there exist equilibria when agents pay too much to the SPS.
Proposition 1.12 There exists a level of cost bKFE with bKFE > K; such
that under the partial exclusion rule, for K 2
h
K; bKFEi the symmetric
punishment is installed, even though it is welfare decreasing.
The logic of the proof is similar to the one in the proposition 1.10. In-
formally, the highest individually rational payment in the equilibrium where
all agents subscribe for the symmetric punishment system services is t = 1:
Hence if the actual cost is K = 1  bKFE the symmetric punishment is
provided, even if it is ine¢ cient (from the proposition 1.7 it follows thatbKFE > K): The departure from e¢ ciency is up to bKFE K = 1  ( )
(2 1) > 0.
Finally as bKFE > bKPE one concludes that the full exclusion provides
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with a larger highest amount of resources that could be extracted ine¢ ciently
from the agents by the SPS, i.e. the risk of over-provision of the SPS is higher
under the full exclusion rule.
Results for the quasi-no exclusion rule:
By contrast to the previous two exclusion rules, agents subscription
strategies are strategic substitutes, each agent would like to subscribe for
the SPS if his encounter does not do it and not to subscribe if he expects
his match to do it. As a result, as the following proposition puts it, there
are no equilibria where all agents would contribute to the costs of the SPS.
Proposition 1.13 In the admission fee game based on the quasi-no ex-
clusion rule, for each K such that K  14(1   EUA()) there exist two
associated thresholds b resulting in truthful revelation. However both thresh-
olds imply coexistence of the SPS and the APS in equilibrium. When K >
1
4(1 EUA()); the only equilibrium is all agents report  > b for any b and
so y = 0:
The proof is in the Appendix.
The intuition why there are only two possible equilibria is that under
quasi-no exclusion rule each agents willingness to join the SPS is decreasing
in the number of agents whom he believe to be under the SPS. This is
because the higher is share of agents who are under the SPS the higher is
the probability for i to match with them and obtain for free the utility equal
to 1. As encounters subscription to protection extends the full protection
to agent i; agents are willing to free-ride on others subscriptions. At the
same time, when others do not subscribe each agent prefers to join the
SPS and obtain rather a sure utility of 1. These gives rise to only two
possible subscription equilibria: with low rate of participation (and high
individually rational t) and with high rate of the participation (and reduced
t), and there are no equilibria with extreme participation rates as it was
with other exclusion rules.
As the result, the quasi-no exclusion rule has opposite welfare implica-
tions. Namely there is in general undercollection of resources for the cost of
the SPS.
Proposition 1.14 Under the quasi-no-exclusion rule there exist a level of
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the cost K 2 14(1  EUA());K, such that it is valuable to introduce the
SPS but the subscription fee game fails to do it.
The proof is omitted, it is straightforward from the proof of the previous
proposition.
Conclusions to the admission fee game with the quasi-no exclusion rule
are 1. There is likely to be under-provision the SPS, i.e. agents fail to collect
resources for the SPS even for intermediate levels of the cost K; 2. There
always exists a positive fraction of agents who remain under the APS even
if the SPS is in place.
1.4 Some Extensions and Discussions
1.4.1 Results when there is a monopolistic provider of asym-
metric punishment
Everywhere I assumed that the marginal costs of using the APS were zero
due to competition among providers. In this section I assume that there is
a monopolistic provider who can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers for the price
of his asymmetric services while he does not change the quality. The results
change a bit.
Assume that the price that a monopolistic provider charges is : Then
the payo¤ matrix from trading can be modied as follows:
strongnweak H C
H 1; 1 1   +   ; 1 +    
C 1 + ; 1   0; 0
(1.16)
i.e. agents pay a monetary fee (the individual marginal cost of asymmet-
ric punishment) only when the punishment  is imposed after equilibrium
plays and it is only when a weak agent cheats on the strong one. This would
a¤ect the equilibrium strategies in the following way (under assumption that
 >  > 1):
i(fHg ; ) =
1   +   
1 +    ; i(fCg ; ) =

1 +    (1.17)
i(fHg ; ) =
   1
  1 ; i(fCg ; ) =
  
  1 : (1.18)
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As the result the expected payo¤ from contracting under asymmetric
punishment would be
EUA() = F ()
2(  ) + ( + 1  2)
(  1)(1 +   ) +
(1 +    )(   1)
  1 (1.19)
It can be shown that the result of full or zero participation rate in trade
under asymmetrically imposed punishment carries over into the case with
non-zero marginal costs. However there appears a condition on the maxi-
mal price that asymmetric enforcer can collect from agents (given that their
outside option is not to trade at all). In particular, it should hold simulta-
neously that  <  + 1 and  < + 1 and  < 2( )2  1 :
When  2 [;  + 1] the third condition implies the second. Hence there
is an upper boundary on the price that a monopolistic provider can charge
  2( )2  1 :
In this case he extracts the entire surplus of the strong agent and the
utilities of any strong and any weak agent would be equal, i.e.
EUA() = EUA() =
(1 +    )(   1)
  1 : (1.20)
Thus, at the ex ante stage, all agents expect to have the same level of
utility, independently of the type ; EUA() = (1+ )( 1) 1 : As the result
all agents would value equally the symmetric punishment system.
The highest e¢ cient level of the cost K of the symmetric punishment
system would be K = 1 EUA() =    1 : It can be seen immediately that
the partial exclusion rule is the most (second-best) optimal exclusion rule.
As the admission fee mechanism would always result in the full subscription
if the admission fee is t  1 EUA(): Moreover to subscribe is a dominant
strategy for any agent; i.e. he would subscribe for the symmetric punishment
independently of his type  and of strategies of the others. Summarizing all
this into Proposition:
Proposition 1.15 When there is a monopolistic provider of the asymmet-
ric punishment services, all agents have the same valuation for the SPS.
Subscribing for the SPS when it applies the partial exclusion rule and posts
the fee t  1  EUA() is a dominant strategy. Hence the subscription fee
game will always have a socially e¢ cient outcome.
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Thus, this result has a repercussion with the results of the section 3.3.2.:
provided that the APS is relatively ine¢ cient compared to the SPS (it im-
poses too high prices or too high or too low punishment), the coordination
issue vanishes and it becomes a dominant strategy for everyone to subscribe
for the SPS. In this case for the SPS "to win" the entire market for en-
forcement services, given its cost, it should apply partial exclusion (when
the APS is monopolistic service) or full exclusion (when the APS is too
ine¢ cient and impose either too high or too low punishment).
One could argue that in order to avoid such outcome, the APS may nd
it benecial to reduce its price and to leave some rents from trade to agents
so that the SPS does attract so easily everyone under its protection. A full
analysis of simultaneous competition in prices and qualities of two systems
is beyond the scope of the current paper and left for future research.
1.4.2 Discussion of implications for the legal system
One could derive some implications on the optimal choice of the exclusion
rules applied by an o¢ cial legal system in order to win over the shadow
sector of an economy (assuming that the latter enforces its contract through
some APS). The optimal choice is likely to depend on how large is the black
market.
First of all, the admission fee could be thought about as a tax that an
entrepreneur has to pay for being a legal entity. By becoming legal, he would
be entitled to enforce contracts via the (e¢ cient) o¢ cial court system. Then,
if the shadow sector of an economy is large for an o¢ cial legal system in order
to attract the whole population under its protection, it is better to start with
the quasi-no exclusion rule. In this case the weakestagents are likely to be
the rst to join, as it is a dominant strategy for them. Afterwards, once the
weakest are legalized, it is e¢ cient to start to apply partial exclusion rule,
in order to attract intermediate "strength" types. Given that previously
weak agents are under protection by the o¢ cial system which applies partial
exclusion rule, the intermediate types are now the weakest ones in the
population. Hence their valuation of the protection by the o¢ cial system
increases and they join the legal sector as well. Finally, when these types
are also attracted and the legal sector becomes of su¢ ciently large size, it
would be benecial to use the full exclusion, as even the strongesttypes
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would nd it protable to pay taxes and trade under the e¢ cient o¢ cial
system as turf of weak agents on which they were getting rents previously
is no longer around.
The exclusion rules are arguably dened by di¤erent rules within a legal
system. One could speculate that:
 the full exclusion rule would be representative for a legal system that
considers any contract made with non-legal entity (e.g. who do not
pay taxes) to be void and not subject to any consideration.
 the partial exclusion rule would be representative for a legal system
which imposes a very high ne on those who are caught to be on the
black market and not being paying taxes.
Hence in the case where it is a legal entrepreneur who cheats the one
who is on the black market, the latter, being afraid of nes, simply will
not apply to the o¢ cial system because of fear to be punished himself
by the system (and so he is excluded); at the same time, when it is
the black market entrepreneur who misbehaves towards the legalized
one, the legal system could pursue the black market entrepreneur and
so he gets punished;
 the quasi-no exclusion rule would represent a legal system in which
an agent who is a legal entity is both under full protection and under
full liability for his behaviour within a contract, even with respect to
those who are on the black market. For the full liability of agents
from the legal sector to be e¤ective one needs that the agents who are
on the black markets do not fear to apply for justice. This arguably
could be insured by various leniency programs for those who revealed
themselves to be previously in the black market.
1.4.3 Further Research
Further research should be devoted to understand the structure of the xed
cost K: One way to impose some structure on K would be to assume that K
is a function of  which itself is a function of , where  is as it was discussed
in the beginning is the probability that the punishment is imposed.
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Another possible way would be explicit modelling of incentives of agents
who provide punishment23. Additionally, if the SPS is the o¢ cial legal sys-
tem, the design of up-to-date codes is likely to be costly too. Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2007) argues for costly codes. The common law system produces
for free, by precedent, e¢ cient rules and codes, (even when judges are bi-
ased, all ine¢ ciencies are averaged away). By contrast, the centralized civil
law system, at least in theory, has to put e¤orts to design the codes explic-
itly in advance. So in addition to incentives one may model explicitly the
process of learning of which laws are e¢ cient.
Obviously, studying explicitly the details of the cost K may allow to
consider other and potentially more optimal mechanisms to collect resources
for the SPS.
1.5 Conclusions
In the paper I have studied whether an institution which is costly but in-
ducing within a contract mutually e¢ cient behaviour could collect resources
to cover its up-front costs.
The main results of the paper are:
 The asymmetric punishment system alone could bring to every agent,
even the weakest one a positive level of utility. Moreover the rate of
honest behaviour is higher as compared to a world with no punish-
ment at all. The higher is the rate of the e¤ective punishment (or the
higher is the e¢ ciency of the APS) the higher is the rate of honest
behaviour in the population. However payo¤s of the weakest agents
worsen proportionally as the level of punishment increases and because
of agentsfreedom not to trade at all, the punishment applied asym-
metrically cannot be increased indenitely. As the result of existence
23The xed cost assumption can be endogenised through an ex post bargaining game
between strong agents and enforcers. This game has an equilibrium, such that each agent
who is strong within a match ex post is able to convince the enforcing agent to rule
in his favour the contract dispute, whoever was wrong, at no cost to him, if there are
competing enforcers.As the result, at ex ante stage, in order to counteract the aggregate
advantages of all agents who are strong at the ex post stage, the population of agents have
to pledge to the enforcement agents the whole surplus available to the strong agents ex
post. This means that the cost of the symmetric punishment system is actually equal to
K = 1
2
(EUA()  1): Whether K Q K depends on the parameters  and :
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of such upper boundary there is always a non-zero level of cheating in
the equilibrium under the APS.
 If the level of punishment is larger than the cheating stake, relatively
strong agents prefer the world where only asymmetric punishment is
available to everyone. Under such parameters constellation, however,
the symmetric punishment system brings higher aggregated payo¤s
than the asymmetric one.
 The contribution game based on exclusion from punishment of non-
payers, in general, is successful in covering costs of the SPS. Even the
strong agents may pay to the cost of the SPS when too many of weak
agents get protected by the SPS.
 This also has a drawback for decentralized provision of the symmetric
punishment agents entire surplus from trade could be extracted by
threatening them with exclusion from contract enforcement services.
As a result there may be an overprovision of the symmetric punishment
system, i.e. it may be installed even when it has a socially ine¢ cient,
high cost.
 The more severe is the exclusion rule the larger is amount of resources
that could be collected from agents. The quasi-no exclusion rule may
be unable to collect the necessary amount even if it is e¢ cient to have
the SPS.
 Because under partial and full exclusion rules contribution strategies
are strategic complements there exist equilibria where relatively strong
agents remain under the APS and relatively weak join the SPS. In
other words, two modes could ine¢ ciently coexist.
 When there is a monopolistic provider of the asymmetric punishment
who charges a fee and extracts the entire ex post surplus of the strong
agents, the unique dominant strategy equilibrium is where all agents
subscribe for the SPS. But, the exclusion rule yet should be either
partial or full and not the mild rule of quasi-no exclusion.
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1.6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof to the Proposition 1.1
Proof.
1. Case  >  : The expected utility from entry into the market is in-
creasing monotonically in type. Hence I will check incentives of the
lowest entering type (it is unique). For any (; ) dene this type e,
and he is found from the identity EUA(e)  0. Namely
F (e) =
(+ 1)(   1)(     1)
2(  ) :
One can see that the participation is full, as r.h.s is below zero, if
 < +1  max. Now I show that for  > max there is no any agent
who would enter.
Suppose  > max. Then there is a fraction of agents, namely F (e)
who take the outside option. The remaining fraction (1   F (e)) re-
assess the utility from participating in the market given (; ): The
expected utility of an agent  2 e;  is:
EUA0() = (F ()  F (e))EU() + (1  F ())EUA():
I search again for an agent such that EUA0()  0, call him e0 :
F (e0) = F (e)
(1 + )(1   + )(  1)
2(  )  
(1 +    )(   1)(+ 1)
2(  )
Now it can be shown that  > max is su¢ cient condition for F (e0) >
F (e) to happen. I.e. if  is too high a new fraction of agents would
prefer to take the outside option. This argument is repeated for any
new e; hence no agent enters.
2. Case  <  : From (1.9) it follows that entry type is dened by (again
the monotonicity of EU implies that there is the unique cut-o¤):
F (e) =
1 +    
2(   ) (1.21)
It holds that F (e) < 1 if  <    1  min i.e. participation is partial
(for F (e)  1 it is enough to nd under which condition 1+ 2( )  1).
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If  is too low it is not protable to enter for a fraction of agents of high
type ( 2
h
e; 
i
). It can be shown similarly to the case with  > 
that full unraveling occurs, but starting with the strongest type.
Proof to the Corollary 1.2
Proof. In the subgame of trading under the asymmetric punishment system
there are following equilibria depending on (; ).
1. if  <    1; the unique pure NE is (i(fHg ; ); j(fHg ; )) = (0; 0);
the rate of participation in the market is zero;
2. if  2 (   1; ) there is full participation with the unique equilibrium
(i(fHg ; ); j(fHg ; )) = (1; 0);
3. if  2 (;  + 1) there is full participation, no pure strategy NE, the
mixed strategies are dened in (1.4),(1.5);
4. if  >  + 1 the rate of participation is zero, there is a NE in mixed
strategies as in (1.4),(1.5)
Proof to the Proposition (1.7):
Proof. Consider the following constellations in (; ) plane
1.  <  <  + 1
The aggregate interim social welfare under asymmetric punishment is
(for any F ()) SWA = ( )+
2 1
(2 1) > 0: The aggregate social welfare
under symmetric punishment is SWA = 1. When  <  <  + 1 it
holds that ( )+
2 1
(2 1) < 1: Hence the highest cost K is dened from
SWS  K  SWA. It is equal K = ( )
(2 1) ; 0 <
( )
(2 1) < 1:
2.    1 <  < 
Here, under asymmetric punishment, the interim social welfare is equal
to 1 too. It is never e¢ cient to install the symmetric punishment sys-
tem from interim perspective24. (But ex post e¢ cient threshold of K
in this case is K = 12).
24But recall that the lower  is, the higher is the equilibirum rate of cheating behaviour.
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3.  =2 [   1;  + 1]
The asymmetric punishment is not active. Hence the social welfare
under absent symmetric punishment is SW 0 = 0. The threshold level
is then K = SWS   SW 0 = 1 (both interim and ex post).
Proof to the Proposition 1.9:
Proof. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to the fact that agents be-
liefs about the actual rate of participation determine their own subscription
strategies. Depending on what is the common belief about the subscription
rate, for a given b; there may be di¤erent actual subscription rates, including
the rate of subscription meant by the mechanism, when b was chosen.
Firstly I shall prove the possibility of the truthful equilibrium. Suppose
all agents report their types truthfully. Then the optimal b for a given level
of the cost K is dened by IC condition
1  F (b) + (1  F (b))  EU()  t  EU(): (1.22)
merged to the budget balance requirement t  F (b) = K :
F (b)2(1  EU()) + F (b))(EU()  EU()) = K: (1.23)
It is easy to check that indeed agents with  > b state truthfully their
types and remain under the APS.
The second equilibrium comes from the observation that agents beliefs
are free and so if every agent expects (by whichever reason) that there is a
subgroup of agents, say an interval
b;eb who report their types to be  < b;
any isolated agent with  2
b;eb is better o¤ from reporting his type to be
 < b rather than saying the truth, as:
1 F (eb)2+F (eb)  (1 F (eb)) EU() K > F (eb)EU() when F (eb) > F (b)
and keeping the costK constant25. Consequently even totally uninformative
equilibrium with F (eb) = 1 can occur for any given b:
25This is because the LHS F (b)2(1 EU())+F (b)(EU() EU())  K is increasing
in F (b): Hence when K remains xed but F (b) increases, the LHC of the participation
constraint remains valid for a given F (b).
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The third equilibrium arises when i believes all other agents report a low
valuation for the symmetric punishment, it is not installed and hence i does
not strictly gain from reporting any positive valuation (= self-fullling).
Proof to the Proposition 1.11
Proof. The proof is very similar to the case with partial exclusion rule. The
truthful equilibrium is dened by equation (merging IR and BB requirement)
(1  EU())  F (b)2 + EU()  F (b) K = 0: (1.24)
The only di¤erence is that for y to be positive, for a relatively high K;
there should exist a common belief F (b) that satises this equation.
The proof of untruthful equilibria, i.e. that it may happen F (be) 6= F (b)
quite the same in the case with partial exclusion. If all agent follow some
untruthful equilibrium strategy, every remaining agent has incentives to play
it as well, due to complementarity of participation decision.
Proof to the Proposition 1.13:
Proof. An agent indi¤erent between joining the SPS and remaining under
the APS is dened by the IC condition 1  t = F (b) + (1  F (b))EUA():
Merging this with the budget balance requirement denes
F (b)(1  EUA())  F (b)2(1  EUA()) = K (1.25)
The LHS is a concave function with a maximum at F (b) = 1=2: From
here follows that the maximum collectible amount is 14(1   EUA()) and
that there are two possible participation equilibria for K  14(1 EUA()).
Namely, (1.25) has two solutions for F (b); both belong to (0; 1) and so
dene two incentive compatible participation thresholds. By proposition
1.8 I chose the highest (SW is increasing in the number of agents who are
under the SPS).
When K > 14(1   EUA()) there is no such IC payment that once ag-
gregate would match this level of the cost.
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Chapter 2
On Uniqueness of Payo¤s to
Beliefs
Abstract1 Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown
that, in models with correlated values, full surplus extraction is only possi-
ble if agentspayo¤s can be inferred from their beliefs about other agents.
For models with exogenous payo¤and belief functions dened on an abstract
type space, Heifetz and Neeman (2006) show that this so-called BDP prop-
erty (beliefs determine preferences) is non-robust in a measure-theoretic
sense. By contrast, we show that BDP is generic in a topological sense if
beliefs are formed by conditioning on available information and the set of
objects about which agents form beliefs is su¢ ciently rich.
2.1 Introduction
The seminal work of Crémer and McLean (1988) (in what follows CM) has
shown that, in common-prior models with incomplete information, correla-
tions of agents types can be used to reduce information rents. In particular,
in an auction with two or more potential buyers, all surplus can be extracted
1This chapter is the joint paper of Martin Hellwig and me. The original title of the
paper is: "Payo¤s Can be Inferred From Beliefs, Generically, When Beliefs are Conditioned
on Information". We would like to thank for helpful discussions Felix Bierbrauer, Jacques
Crémer, Bruno Jullien, Benny Moldovanu and Stephen Morris.
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if the buyers have correlated private values. This work has inspired a num-
ber of other papers, in particular, McAfee and Reny (1992) extending the
CM result to auctions with a continuum of types. Most recently, Kosenok
and Severinov (2008) provide a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
an arbitrary allocation of surplus among types to be incentive-compatible.
The analysis of CM has, however, been challenged by Neeman (2004) and
Heifetz and Neeman (2006). They show that CMs conclusions concerning
full surplus extraction depend on a fairly restrictive assumption, which is
implicit in CMs modelling of incomplete information. They refer to this
assumption as the BDP condition: "beliefs determine preferences". Under
this condition, an agents payo¤ can be precisely inferred from his beliefs, or,
equivalently, in any two states of the world in which an agent has di¤erent
payo¤s, he must also have di¤erent beliefs about the rest of the world.
The analysis of Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) greatly
improves our understanding of the CM result: Di¤erences in beliefs induce
di¤erences in attitudes towards bets or, more generally, state-contingent
payment schemes. These di¤erences in attitudes can be used to extract
rents, i.e., to make an agent surrender the surplus he gets even though this
surplus depends on the state of the world and the mechanism designer has
no way to observe the state or the surplus directly. However, this is only
possible if di¤erences in payo¤s across states of the world are aligned with
di¤erences in beliefs. If there are two states of the world where an agent
has di¤erent payo¤s and the same beliefs about the rest of the world, there
is no way to prevent the agent from earning an information rent. Thus,
Heifetz and Neeman (2006) show that full surplus extraction in an auction
is impossible if BDP fails to hold. For a public-good provision problem with
participation constraints, Neeman (2004) shows that, as in the independent-
private-values analysis of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), in an environment
with many participants, feasible provision levels are close to zero if BDP is
violated in such a way that for each agent and each state of the world in
which this agent gets a positive payo¤ from the public good, there is another
state of the world in which the agent has the same beliefs, but a zero payo¤
from the enjoyment of the public good.
At this point, the question is what to make of the BDP property in mod-
els with common priors. Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) in-
dicate that this property is very restrictive. In Heifetz and Neeman (2006),
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a geometric and a measure-theoretic version of this statement are stated
and proved; a topological version is discussed, but, for lack of a clear view
as to the appropriate topology on the space of incomplete-information mod-
els, such a result is not established. In a companion paper, we show that
non-BDP models with common priors are indeed generic if we map any
incomplete-information model into the associated universal-type-space for-
mulation à la Mertens and Zamir (1985) and we endow the set of universal-
type-space formulations with the natural topology as suggested by Mertens
and Zamir (1985).23
Statements about genericity, robustness, or non-robustness of a certain
property always depend on the space to which one is referring. Most of
the literature, including Crémer and McLean (1988), Neeman (2004), and
Heifetz and Neeman (2006), avoid working with a universal type space,
which would be clumsy and cumbersome. In Crémer and McLean (1988),
the type space is specied so that people observe their payo¤s, and their
beliefs correspond to regular conditional distributions given the payo¤s that
they have observed. In this setting, genericity of BDP follows from the
assumption that the set of payo¤ types is nite and, for a generic set of
priors, the map from payo¤ types to conditional distributions is one-to-one.
By contrast, in Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006), payo¤s and
beliefs are both determined by exogenously given functions of some abstract
"type" variables.
Our approach lies between Crémer and McLean (1988) and Neeman
(2004) or Heifetz and Neeman (2006). Like Crémer and McLean (1988),
we treat beliefs as being endogenous, rather than part of the specication
of a "type". In contrast to Crémer and McLean (1988), however, we allow
for the possibility that beliefs may reect the inuence of variables other
than payo¤s. Specically, we assume that agents form beliefs by observing
2 I.e., the weak topology on the space of priors that is induced by the product topology
on the universal type space when the parameters of the underlying game are topogized so
that payo¤ functions are continuous and the beliefs at each level of the hiearchy are given
the weak topology.
3However, whereas this genericity result implies that any BDP model can be approx-
imated by a sequence of non-BDP models, we have a continuity result showing, as one
moves along this sequences, the maximum level of surplus extraction in the non-BDP
models converges to the maximum level of surplus extraction in the BDP model, i.e., to
full surplus extraction.
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certain information variables and conditioning on these observations. The
information variables include the agentsown payo¤ parameters. However,
the inuence of payo¤ parameters on beliefs may be confounded by other
information variables. The question then is to what extent the payo¤ pa-
rameters, or any of the other variables on which people condition, can be
recovered from their beliefs.
To get an idea for what we are after, consider an environment with
two agents in which the preferences of agent i depend on a parameter i;
which is taken to be private information. Suppose also that each agent
receives a signal si about the other agents preference parameter. If the
signal s2 that agent 2 receives is informative about the preference parameter
1 of agent 1; these two variables must be correlated. This implies that the
agent 1s expectation about the signal s2 of agent 2 must depend on his
payo¤ parameter 1: If this dependence is one-to-one, e.g., monotonic, the
BDP property arises as a matter of course. By looking at agent 1s beliefs
about the signal that agent 2 has received about agent 1s payo¤, one can
infer agent 1s own payo¤ parameter. By contrast, 1 cannot be inferred
from agent 1s belief about s2 if, in addition to his own payo¤ parameter,
agent 1 also observes a signal s1 about s2; in this case, the e¤ects of 1
and s1 on agent 10s belief about s2 cannot be disentangled. However, the
inference from agent 10s beliefs to his payo¤ type should be possible if the
set of variables about which agent 1 forms beliefs is su¢ ciently large and,
as a source of information, none of the variables on which he conditions is
redundant.
The formal analysis below makes this intuition precise. Following Au-
mann (1987), we assume that all heterogeneity in beliefs across agents is
due to a heterogeneity of information. Agents have a common prior on the
state of the world. Given this prior, their beliefs are determined by updating
after the observation of additional signals; their own preference parameters
are among the signals on which they condition. To the extent that signals
di¤er from agent to agent, the beliefs to which they give rise are naturally
heterogeneous.
In such a setting, agents form beliefs about the other agentssignals as
well as their payo¤s. If the set of parameters of other agents about which
each agent forms his beliefs is su¢ ciently rich, these beliefs will tend to
reect all the information on which they are based, including the agents
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own payo¤ parameters. In this case, the BDP property arises as a generic
property of common priors.
We prove two versions of this claim. The rst version concerns models
with nitely many types for each agent. We show that, in such models, if the
number of possible types is the same for all agents, the BDP property holds
for an open and dense set of priors. With nitely many types for each agent,
there are nitely many states of the world, a prior is just a nite-dimensional
vector, and the terms open and dense need no further explanation.
The second version of our claim concerns models with a continuum of
types. Here, we treat the type ti of any agent i as an ni-dimensional vector,
an element of some compact set Ti  Rni . We restrict our attention to
common priors with densities that belong to the space C1(RN ;R) of con-
tinuously di¤erentiable functions from RN into R where N =
P
i ni: If we
endow the set of such priors with the topology that is induced by the strong
topology on the space C1(RN ;R) of density functions, we nd that, if ni
is the same for all agents and if there are at least four agents, then, for
an open and dense set of priors, the BDP property holds for all agents.
More generally, the BDP property is generic if, for each agent i; we have
2ni + 1  N i :=
P
j 6=i nj :
The result is a consequence of Whitneys Embedding Theorem4. The
vector t i = (tj)j 6=i of the other agentstypes, about which agent i forms
his beliefs, belongs to the space RN i : For any value ti of the agents own
type, therefore, the conditional expectation t i(ti) of the other agentstypes
that is induced by ti is an N i-dimensional vector. For priors with densities
belonging to C1(RN ;R), the map ti ! t i(ti) is a continuously di¤erentiable
function from Rni into RN i :Whitneys Embedding Theorem implies that, if
2ni+1  N i; then any such function can be approximated by a sequence of
embeddings. We show that, if we start from a given C1 density on RN ; then
the embeddings approximating the conditional-expectations function RN are
actually the conditional-expectations functions for t i given ti under suitable
perturbations of the prior density. Given that, by denition, embeddings are
injective, under these perturbed priors, it is always possible to recover the
type ti of agent i from the agents conditional expectation t i about the
4 In economics, Whitneys Embedding Theorem has previously played an important
role in the literature on generic existence of completely revealing rational expectations
equilibria, in particular, Allen (1981).
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other agentstypes. In particular, it is possible to recover the agents payo¤
parameters, which are just one part of his type ti:
These genericity results are at odds with the results of Neeman (2004),
and Heifetz and Neeman (2006). The di¤erence is due to our treating beliefs
as resulting from conditioning on information and taking account of the fact
that payo¤ parameters are part of the information about the information of
the others on which agents condition.
Our results are also at odds with the claims of Barelli (2009). Relying
on an approach similar to that of Heifetz and Neeman (2006), but using
a topological rather than measure-theoretic notion of genericity, he asserts
that BDP fails to hold for an open and dense set of models. There are some
di¢ culties with his analysis, however. He begins by introducing an abstract
type space , together with pairs of mappings, one for each agent, that spec-
ify payo¤s and beliefs for each type. Then he denes a model as a pair Y; 
such that (i) Y   is minimal with respect to the requirement that for any
agent and any type of agent, beliefs assign probability one to the set Y and
(ii)  is a prior on Y that is consistent with the specied beliefs as posteriors
at the given types. In this construction, Y is endogenous to the specica-
tion of payo¤ and belief functions. In the subsequent analysis of genericity,
however, Y is treated as exogenous, e.g. in considering the approximation
of a model with a continuum of types by a sequence of models with nitely
many types. Moreover, in these approximations, no account is given of the
requisite adaptations of belief functions: Presumably, in a model with -
nitely many types, beliefs will be probability measures on nite sets, rather
than the continuum. Given these lacunae, we nd it di¢ cult to interpret
his results. In any case, like Heifetz and Neeman (2006), Barelli (2009) does
not model the notion that beliefs result from conditioning on information
and that an agents payo¤ parameters are part of the information on which
he conditions his beliefs.
In the following, Section 2 lays out the basic framework of our analysis.
Section 3 introduces the BDP property and gives a few examples in order to
build some intuition. Section 4 formulates and proves our genericity results.
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2.2 The Basic Framework
Whereas our analysis concerns abstract issues of incomplete-information
modelling, we nd it convenient to base our presentation on a concrete
model of social choice. In this model, there are I  2 agents, indexed by
i = 1; ::; I: There is a single private good and a social decision variable g:
Each agent i has a quasi-linear utility function
ui(g; i;mi) = v(g; i) +mi; (2.1)
where mi is the amount of private-good consumption, and i is a payo¤
parameter. The allocation problem is to choose g and m1; :::mI . subject to
the feasibility constraint
K(g) +
IX
i=1
mi  Y ; (2.2)
here K(g)  0 is a resource cost and Y is a an exogenously given measure
of aggregate resource availability.
The choice that is taken will typically depend on 1; :::; I : However, we
assume that, for each i; the payo¤ parameter i is private information of
agent i: To implement a social choice function
(1; :::; I)! (g(1; :::; I);m1(1; :::; I);mI(1; :::; I)); (2.3)
one must have a way of extracting the relevant information about 1; :::; I
from the di¤erent participants.
To model information, we assume that there is some underlying space

 of possible states of the world, and that all beliefs are derived from a
common prior F on the space 
: Agent is payo¤ parameter i is given by
a function
! ! i(!); (2.4)
in addition to this payo¤ parameter, the agent also observes a signal si;
which is given by a function
! ! si(!); (2.5)
The functions i(); si() take values in given sets i; Si; respectively.
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In this setting, we may think of the agents type as a pair
ti = (i; si); (2.6)
an element of the type space
Ti = i  Si: (2.7)
In our analysis, the underlying probability space 
 matters only to the
extent that it a¤ects the types t1; :::; tI of agents 1; :::; I: there is therefore
no loss of generality in assuming that

 =
IY
i=1
Ti (2.8)
and that the maps i() and si() are simply the projections from 
 to i and
Si; respectively.
Given the information that i() and si() take the values i and si; agent
i updates his expectations, replacing the prior F by the conditional distri-
bution on 
 that is induced by this information. Denote this conditional
distribution as Bi(i; si) and consider the induced marginal distributions on
Ti and on T i :=
IY
j=1
j 6=i
Tj : Because the agent knows his own type, the marginal
distribution on Ti is simply the degenerate distribution that assigns all mass
to the observed ti = (i; si): The marginal distribution on T i represents
the agents conditional beliefs about the other agentss types; we denote
this distribution as bi(i; si):
2.3 The BDP Property
2.3.1 Denition
The distribution bi(i; si); i.e. the conditional distribution on T i that is
induced by the prior F and the information that i() and si() take the
values i and si; corresponds to what is usually referred to as the agents
belief type. As discussed in Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006),
a key question is to what extent the payo¤ type can be inferred from the ob-
servation of the agents belief type bi(i; si): Given that we have identied 
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with the product
IY
i=1
Ti and the functions i() and si() with the projections
to i and Si; this is a question about the prior F: The following denition
denes the BDP property as a property of the prior F:
Definition 2.1 A prior F on the product
IY
i=1
Ti exhibits the BDP prop-
erty if, for i = 1; :::; I and F -almost all (i; si) 2 Ti;
f(0i; s0i) 2 Tijbi(0i; s0i) = bi(i; si)g  fig  Si: (2.9)
According to this denition, any two types ti = (i; si) and t0i = (
0
i; s
0
i)
that induce the same beliefs bi(0i; s0i) = bi(i; si) must also involve the same
payo¤ types 0i = i: As discussed in the introduction, this condition plays
a key role in the analysis of surplus extraction in models with correlated
values.
2.3.2 Examples
We illustrate the BDP property by means of a few examples. We begin with
the example given in the introduction.
Example 2.2 Let I = 2; 1 = S2 = R; 2 = S1 = f0g; and suppose that
F is a multivariate normal distribution. Then
E[s2j1; s1] = cov(s2; 1)
var1
(1   E1) + Es2: (2.10)
If cov(s2; 1) 6= 0; i.e., if the signal s2 contains any information about 1;
one can infer 1 from the belief variable E[s2j1; s1] and the parameters
E1; Es2; cov(s2; 1); var1 of the prior F: Thus, for any prior on T that is
multivariate normal; the BDP property holds unless the signal s2 is uncor-
related with the payo¤ type 1: Within the set of models covered by Example
2.2, BDP is generic.
In Example 2.2, agent 2 receives a signal about agent 1s payo¤ type.
Knowing this, agent 1 treats his own payo¤ type as a signal about agent
2s signal. Therefore, his belief about agent 2s signal varies with his payo¤
type. The relation is monotonic, and his payo¤ type can be inferred from
his belief type.
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Example 2.3 Let I = 2; 1 = S1 = S2 = R; 2 = f0g; and suppose that
F is a multivariate normal distribution. Then
E[s2j1; s1] = (1   E1) + s(s1   Es1) + Es2; (2.11)
where

 s

=

cov(s2; 1) cov(s2; s1)
 var1 cov(1; s1)
cov(1; s1) vars1
! 1
:
(2.12)
In this case, as in Example 2.2, agent 1s belief about agent 2s signal is
a¤ected by agent 1s payo¤ type unless cov(s2; 1) = 0. However, if agent
1s own signal is also correlated with s2; it is not possible to infer 1 from
the belief variable E[s2j1; s1] and the parameters of the prior F: For such
an inference, one would also have to know the realization of agent 1s own
signal. In this setting, for any prior on T that is multivariate normal, even
if cov(s2; 1) 6= 0; the BDP property fails to hold except in the special case
where cov(s2; s1) = 0:
Example 2.4 Let I = 2; 1 = S1 = R;2 = f0g; S2 = R2; and suppose
that F is a multivariate normal distribution. Then 
E[s12j1; s1]
E[s22j1; s1]
!
= A
 
1   E1
s1   Es1
!
+
 
Es12
Es22
!
; (2.13)
where A = 21 111 and 21;11 are submatrices of the variance-covariance
matrix  of s12; s
2
2; 1; s1 partitioned as
 =
 
22 21
12 11
!
(2.14)
so as to reect the distinction between the variables that agent 1 observes and
what he does not observe. In this specication, both 1 and s1 can be inferred
from the conditional expectations E[s12j1; s1] and E[s22j1; s1] whenever the
matrix A is invertible, i.e., whenever the matrix 21 in the partition (2.14)
is nonsingular. Given that the set of nonsingular two-by-two matrices is
open and dense in the set of all two-by-two matrices, the BDP property is
generic within the set of models covered by Example 2.4.
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In Examples 2.3 and 2.4 the robustness of nonrobustness of the BDP
property depends on whether or not the dimension of the set of objects
about which agent 1 forms his beliefs is large enough to permit a precise
inference about the di¤erent variables on which he conditions. If it is large
enough to permit a disentangling of the di¤erent information variables on
which he relies, then, in particular, one can infer his payo¤ type from his
beliefs.
Whereas Example 2.3 involves a failure of BDP due to a confounding
of inuences of di¤erent information variables, the following Example 2.5
shows that BDP will also fail if, for given parameters of the prior F; the
map from payo¤ types to conditional expectations is not monotonic (not
one-to-one). Subsequently, Example 2.6 will show that this problem is likely
to disappear if there are more variables about which to form expectations so
that the vector of conditional expectations has a su¢ ciently high dimension.
Example 2.5 Let I = 2; 1 = S2 = R; 2 = S1 = f0g; and suppose that
F is the distribution that is generated when
s2 = (1)
2 + "; (2.15)
where 1 and " are independent normal random variables. In this case, the
conditional distribution of s2 given 1 is normal with mean
E[s2j1; s1] = (21   E21) + Es2 (2.16)
and variance V ar": From the belief E[s2j1; s1]; one can infer 21; but one
cannot tell whether is the positive of the negative solution of the equation
21 = E[s2j1; s1]  Es2 + E21: (2.17)
The BDP property fails to hold.
Example 2.6 Let I = 2; 1 = R; 2 = S1 = f0g; S2 = R2; and suppose
that F is the distribution that is generated when
s12 = (1)
2 + "; (2.18)
s22 = A1 +B (1)
2 +  (2.19)
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where 1,", and  are independent normal random variables. In this case,
the conditional distribution of s12 and s
2
2 given 1 is normal with means
E[s12j1; s1] = (21   E21) + Es12; (2.20)
E[s22j1; s1] = A(1   E1) +B(21   E21) + Es22 (2.21)
and variance-covariance matrix
 
V ar" 0
0 V ar
!
: If A 6= 0; then from
(2.20) and (2.21), one obtains
1 = E1 +
1
A

E[s22j1; s1]  Es22  B(E[s12j1; s1]  Es12

; (2.22)
which shows that 1 can be inferred by looking at E[s12j1; s1] and E[s22j1; s1]
jointly. By looking at the two belief variables together, one overcomes the dif-
culty that neither belief variable alone is injective in 1: The BDP property
holds unless A = 0:
2.4 Genericity Results
2.4.1 BDP with Finite Type Sets
Turning from these examples to a more general analysis, we rst consider
the case where type sets are nite. If each type set Ti is nite, with ni
elements, the state space T is also nite, with N =
IY
i=1
ni elements, and the
prior F is represented by a vector  2 RN ; such thatPNk=1k = 1: The set
of such vectors is endowed with the usual (Euclidean) topology.
Proposition 2.7 Assume that, for each i; Ti is a nite set with ni distinct
elements. For any i; let
N i :=
IY
j=1
j 6=i
nj (2.23)
be the cardinality of the set T i :=
IY
j=1
j 6=i
Tj : If ni  N i for all i; then BDP
holds for an open and dense set of priors on T:
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Proof. For any i; a vector  of probabilities on T can be written in matrix
form as (i) = (tit i)tit i where the di¤erent rows refer to di¤erent types
ti of agent i and di¤erent columns refer to the di¤erent elements t i of T i:
For each ti; the conditional belief bi(ti) given ti of agent i about the other
agentstypes is represented by a vector of conditional probabilities on T i:
BayesLaw implies that, under the prior , this vector is proportional to
the vector (tit i); one can write:
bi(ti) = (ti) (tit i)t i ; (2.24)
where
(ti) =
1P
t i2T i tit i
(2.25)
is chosen to ensure that the entries in (2.24) sum to one. (2.24) and (2.25)
imply that, if the rows (tit i)t i ; ; ti 2 Ti, of the matrix (i) are linearly
independent, then so are the belief vectors bi(ti); ti 2 Ti: This implies, in
particular, that the belief vectors bi(ti); ti 2 Ti; are all distinct and the
function ti ! bi(ti) is invertible, i.e. one can infer the type ti of agent i from
his belief vector. Given that ti = (i; si); this means, in particular, that one
can infer i from bi(ti):
By Lemma 2.9, the assumption that ni  N i implies that the set of
niN i matrices with linearly independent rows is an open and dense subset
Pi of Rni  RN i = RN : Because I is nite, the intersection P = \Ii=1Pi of
these sets for di¤erent i is still open and dense. If the prior  belongs to P,
then, for any i; belief vectors bi(ti); ti 2 Ti; are all distinct and one can infer
the type ti of agent i from his belief vector; in this case, BDP is satised.
Proposition 2.7 echoes similar statements in Heifetz and Neeman (2006)
and Barelli (2009). The assumption that ni  N i for all i ensures that
the spaces of things about which agents from their beliefs are always richer
than the spaces of variables on which they condition. Moreover, niteness
ensures that, generically, the map from types to beliefs is one-to-one.
2.4.2 BDP with a Continuum of Types
We next allow for a continuum of types of each agent. We assume that, for
each i; there is a positive integer ni such that the set Ti of types of agent
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i is a subset of Rni : The products
Y
j
Tj and
Y
j 6=i
Tj are subsets of RN and
RN i ; respectively, where N =
PI
j=1 nj and N i := N   ni:
We restrict attention to priors  with compact supports and with contin-
uously di¤erentiable densities, i.e., with densities f that are C1 functions on
RN : The space of such priors is endowed with the topology that is induced
by convergence of supports in the Hausdor¤metric and by strong (uniform)
C1 convergence of the densities. Thus, a sequence fvkg of priors with sup-
ports T 
k  RN and densities fk : RN ! R+ converges to a limit  with
support T  and density f if and only if the Hausdor¤ distance between T 
k
and T  converges to zero and fk converges to f , C
1-uniformly.
The beliefs bi(ti) of any agent i are now elements of the space of measures
on RN i : By the same logic as before, the BDP property holds if, for any i;
the function ti ! bi(ti) is injective.
Proposition 2.8 If 2ni + 1  N i for all i; then BDP holds on an open
and dense subset of the set of priors with compact support and continuously
di¤erentiable densities, endowed with the topology of Hausdor¤ convergence
of supports and strong C1 convergence of densities.
Proof. We will show that, for any i; there is an open and dense set Pi of
priors with compact supports and continuously di¤erentiable densities such
that BDP holds for agent i if the prior belongs to Pi. As in the proof of
Proposition 2.7, the desired result then follows from the observation that
the nite intersection P = \Ii=1Pi of these open and dense sets for di¤erent
i is itself open and dense.
Fix any i: For any  with compact support T  and continuously di¤er-
entiable density f ; let
f i() =
Z
T  i
f(; t i)dt i
be the density of the marginal distribution for ti that is induced by : Be-
cause f is nonzero only on the compact set T  and because f is contin-
uously di¤erentiable; the values of f and its derivatives are bounded. By
Lebesgues bounded-convergence theorem, it follows that f i is continuously
di¤erentiable. Moreover, the values of f i are nonzero only on the projection
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T i of T
 to the space of agent is types.5:
Because f i is continuously di¤erentiable, the interior T

i of the set T

i is
nonempty. Moreover, for any ti 2 T i ; we have f i(ti) > 0: For such ti; the
posterior belief bi(ti; ) is a measure on RN i that has a density i(jti; )
satisfying
i(t ijti; ) =
f(ti; t i)
f i(ti)
(2.26)
for all t i 2 RN i : The conditional expectation of t i given ti 2 T i can then
be written as
t i(ti) :=
Z
RN i
t ii(t ijti; )dt i =
R
RN i t if(ti; t i)dt i
f i(ti)
: (2.27)
Observe that f(ti; t i) = 0 unless the pair (ti; t i) belongs to the compact
set T  : Therefore, the integrand in (2.27) is zero unless t i belongs to the
projection T  i of T
 to the space of types of agents other than i: By the con-
tinuity of the projection mapping, compactness of T  implies compactness
of T  i: Therefore, the conditional expectation (2.27) is well dened.
Because the densities f and f i are continuously di¤erentiable, the map
is ti ! t i(ti) belongs to the space C1(T i ;RN i) of continuously di¤eren-
tiable functions from T i into RN i : If this map is an injection, then so must
be the map ti ! f(ti; ) from T i into C1(RN i ;R). Hence, it su¢ ces to
show that, for an open and dense set of priors ; the map ti ! t i(ti) from
T i into RN i is an injection.
Given the assumption that 2ni +1  N i; Whitneys Embedding Theo-
rem (Mas-Colell (1985), p. 37) implies that, for any  and any " > 0 there
exists an embedding ti ! t^" i(ti) such thatt^" i(ti)  t i(ti) < " (2.28)
for all ti: Given this embedding, we consider the function f" such that, for
ti 2 T i and t i 2 RN i ;
f" (ti; t i) = f
 
ti; t i   t^" i(ti) + t i(ti)

(2.29)
and, for ti 2 RninT i and t i 2 RN i ;
f" (ti; t i) = 0: (2.30)
5We allow for the possibility that T  is a proper subset of the product
Y
T i :
55
2.4. GENERICITY RESULTS
Using the change of variables
t^ i = t i  
 
t^" i(ti)  t i(ti)

; (2.31)
we computeZ
RN i
f" (ti; t i)dt i =
Z
RN i
f(ti; t^ i)dt^ i = f i(ti) > 0 (2.32)
for any ti 2 T i andZ
RN
f" (ti; t i)dt idti =
Z
T i
Z
RN i
f" (ti; t i)dt idti =
Z
T i
f i(ti)dti = 1;
(2.33)
which shows that the function f" is actually the density f" of a probability
measure ".
We claim that f" is also continuously di¤erentiable. To simplify the
notation, write t^" i(ti) = t

 i(ti) = 0 for ti 2 RninT i and combine (2.29) and
(2.30) into the single equation
f" (ti; t i) = f
 
ti; t i   t^" i(ti) + t i(ti)

: (2.34)
From (2.34), one immediately sees that f" is continuously di¤erentiable at
any point (ti; t i) at which t^" i() and t i() are continuously di¤erentiable;
in particular, f" is continuously di¤erentiable at any point (ti; t i) with
ti =2 (T i nT i ): Moreover, (2.30) yields
Df" (ti; t i) = 0 (2.35)
for any for ti 2 RninT i and t i 2 RN i : Continuity of Df" requires that
(2.35) also holds ti 2 (T i nT i ) and that
Df" (t0i; t0 i) is uniformly close to
zero if t0i is close to some ti 2 (T i nT i ):
Using (2.32), for any ti 2 T i ; one also computes
t
"
(ti) =
R
RN i t if
"
 (ti; t i)dt iR
RN i f
"
 (ti; t i)dt i
=
R
RN i
 
t^ i +
 
t^" i(ti)  t i(ti)

f(ti; t^ i)dt^ iR
RN i f(ti; t^ i)dt^ i
=
R
RN i t^ if(ti; t^ i)dt^ iR
RN i f(ti; t^ i)dt^ i
+ t^" i(ti)  t i(ti)
= t^" i(ti):
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Because the map ti ! t^" i(ti) is an embedding, it follows that the map
ti ! f" (ti; ) from T i into C1(RN i ;R) is an injection. The measure " that
has the density f" = f" must therefore have the BDP property for agent i:
By (2.29) and (2.30), the support T 
"
of the measure " is the closure
of the set of pairs (ti; t i) such that (ti; t i  
 
t^" i(ti)  t i(ti)
 2 T  : By
(2.28), it follows that the Hausdor¤ distance between the sets T 
"
and T 
is no greater than ": As " goes to zero, the sets T 
"
converge to T  :
Because
t^" i(ti)  t i(ti) < " for all ti 2 T i ; one also has
jf" (ti; t i)  f(ti; t i)j 
Dt if "
for all ti 2 T i and t i 2 RN i : For ti 2 RninT i and t i 2 RN i
jf" (ti; t i)   f(ti; t i)j = 0
by construction. Given that the derivatives of f are continuous, a similar
argument shows that, for any  > 0; there exists "() such that, if " 2
(0; "()); one has
kDf" (ti; t i) Df(ti; t i)k < 
for all ti 2 T i and t i 2 RN i : For ti 2 RninT i and t i 2 RN i
kDf" (ti; t i) Df(ti; t i)k = 0:
Hence, as "! 0; the priors ", which satisfy BDP converge to the given
prior :
This shows that the set of priors satisfying BDP for agent i is dense.
To show that the set of such priors is also open, we note that, if a sequence
of priors f"g converges to a prior ; then the conditional-expectations
functions ti ! t" i(ti) that are induced by the measures " converge in
C1(Ti;RN i) to the conditional-expectations function ti ! t i(ti) that is
induced by : If the function ti ! t i(ti) is an embedding then so, for any
su¢ ciently small " > 0 must be the function ti ! t" i(ti). This follows
because embeddings are open and dense in C1(Ti;RN i):
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We conclude the paper with two remarks. First, the assumption of a common
prior is strictly speaking not necessary for our analysis. If di¤erent agents
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have di¤erent priors, our analysis will still go through, provided be allow
for the space of other agentstypes to be rich enough so that, generically,
each agents beliefs make active use of all his information, including the
information about his own payo¤.
Second, we conjecture that the dimensionality assumption in Proposition
2.8 is not necessary for the conclusion. In the continuous-type model, each
agents belief about the other agents is a probability measure on a set with
the cardinality of the continuum. The space of such probability measures
itself is an innite-dimensional space. In principle, therefore, it should be
possible to use something like the Whitney Embedding Theorem to show
that, generically, the maps ti ! bi(ti) are injective. The problem is that
these mappings do not directly lend themselves to a di¤erential-topology
argument. Any detour, e.g., by looking at the integrals with respect to the
measures bi(ti) of the elements g1; g2; ::: of a separating sequence of functions,
raises questions about the measures that would generate the approximating
embeddings. As yet, we have not been able to resolve these questions.
Therefore, we have imposed the dimensionality assumption that 2ni + 1 
N i for all i; i.e., that the dimension of any one agents type space be less
than one half the sum of the dimensions of all the other agentstype spaces.
2.6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Lemma 2.9 For any m and n; the set Am;n of m  n matrices that have
rank min(m;n) is an open and dense subset of Rmn (in the usual topology).
Proof. It su¢ ces to prove the result for the case m = n: For any m 
m matrix A; let Dm(A) be the determinant. The map A ! Dm(A) is a
continuous function from Rm2 into R: For any A 2 Am, one has Dm(A) 6= 0
by continuity of Dm(); there exists an open neighbourhood B(A) of A such
that Dm(A0) 6= 0 for all A0 2 B(A) and, hence, B(A)  A: It follows that
[A2AB(A)  Am:
Since, trivially, one also has
Am [A2A B(A);
it follows that
Am= [A2A B(A):
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As a union of open sets, Am itself is open.
To prove that Am is dense in Rm2 ; an induction argument is applied. For
m = 1; A1 = fA 2 RjA 6= 0g; so obviously any A 2 R can be approximated
by a sequence in A1:
If m > 1; suppose that the claim is true for m  1 and note that, for any
A 2 Rm2 , one has
Dm(A) =
mX
i=1
a1i( 1)i+1Dm 1(A1i);
where, for i = 1; :::;m; A1i is the (m  1) (m  1) matrix that is obtained
from A by eliminating the rst row and the i-th column. By the induction
hypothesis, there is a sequence of matrices fAk11g converging to A11 such
that Dm 1(Ak11) 6= 0 for all k: For any k and any a^11; let A^k(a^11) be the
matrix that is obtained from A if a11 is replaced by a^11 and the submatrix
A11 is replaced by Ak11: Then
Dm(A^
k(a^11)) = a^11Dm 1(Ak11) +
mX
i=2
a1i( 1)i+1Dm 1(Ak1i);
where, for i = 2; :::m; Ak1i is the (m 1)(m 1)matrix that is obtained from
A^k(a^11) by eliminating the rst row and the i-th column; these submatrices
are obviously independent of a^11.
Consider the sequence fA^k(a11)g that is obtained by setting a^11 = a11
so that the rst diagonal element of the matrix is not changed at all. By
construction, this sequence converges to A. If it has a subsequence fkrg
such that limr!1 kr =1 and Dm(A^kr(a11)) 6= 0 for all r; this subsequence
provides the desired approximation of A by elements of Am. Alternatively,
suppose that Dm(A^k(a11)) = 0 for all but nitely many k: In this case,
consider the sequence fA^k(a11+ 1k )g that is obtained by setting a^11 = a11+ 1k
for k = 1; 2; ::: By construction, this sequence also converges to A: For any
k, one has
Dm(A^
k(a11 +
1
k
)) =
1
k
Dm 1(Ak11) +Dm(A^
k(a11)):
Because Dm(A^k(a11)) = 0 for all but nitely many k; it follows that
Dm(A^
k(a11 +
1
k
)) =
1
k
Dm 1(Ak11) 6= 0
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and, hence, A^k(a11 + 1k ) 2 Am for all but nitely many k:
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Chapter 3
Details Behind Belief
Hierarchies Matter
Abstract1 In the existing mechanism design literature di¤erent types, i.e.
types with di¤erent sets of information, are usually treated as "redundant"
if they have the same beliefs hierarchies about others payo¤s. Here we model
strategically relevant signals as an explicit part of agentstypes and show
that there exist social choice functions which are not implementable on a
payo¤-based universal type space but which are implementable on a set
of "redundant" payo¤-and-signals-based type spaces which map into that
payo¤-based universal type space.
3.1 Introduction
Several recent papers in the mechanism design have sought implementation
results for the case where agents, in addition to having private information
about their payo¤ characteristics, know privately their beliefs about oth-
erspotential payo¤ characteristics and othersbeliefs (e.g. Neeman (2004),
Heifetz and Neeman (2006), Bergemann and Morris (2005)).
1This chapter is the joint paper of Martin Hellwig and me. We would like to thank
Felix Bierbrauer, Jacques Crémer, Bruno Jullien, Stephen Morris, Tymoy Mylovanov
and Michael Vogt for helpful discussions of ideas at di¤erent stages of this project.
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Agentsprivate information about their beliefs has been shown, in gen-
eral, to lead to further allocative ine¢ ciencies (Fang and Morris (2006),
Skrzypacz and Feinberg (2005), Neeman (2004)). Specically, Neeman (2004)
and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have demonstrated that the result of Crémer
and McLean (1988) fails to hold once agentsbeliefs about otherstypes be-
come imperfectly correlated to their own payo¤s, i.e. once the so-called
"belief-determine-preferences" (BDP) condition is violated. The BDP con-
dition requires that any interim belief type that an agent could have is
associated with at most one possible payo¤ type. It is the key condition for
the lottery mechanism in Crémer and McLean (1988) to work.
In order to model agentsheterogeneity in beliefs, this literature recurs
to the construction of the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985)
and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) (who, in turn, have formalized the idea
of Harsanyi (1967/68)). In this construction one species some underlying
space of strategic uncertainty 
 relevant for agents payo¤s and a description
of agentshierarchies of beliefs about it, i.e. agents beliefs about payo¤ rel-
evant uncertainty, agents beliefs about othersbeliefs about payo¤ relevant
uncertainty, etc. A collection of all hierarchies of beliefs together with the
set 
 is called "
-based universal type space". It is "universal" because by
its construction it contains any coherent hierarchy of beliefs about 
 that
could exist and each hierarchy has a unique representation in it. This, in
turn, justies overwhelming use of this construction in the game-theoretic
and mechanism design literature it is a "terminal" space of types for all
models of information and so, it is argued, all results could be expressed in
terms of types in the 
-based universal type space.
In this type space, di¤erent models of information are regarded as "re-
dundant" if they map into the same 
-based hierarchies of beliefs. In other
words, any sequence of information types which all have the same hierar-
chies of beliefs about 
 is not treated as a sequence of separate types even
if they are di¤erent in the way that these hierarchies have been obtained
(i.e. in how agents have updated some prior given their information their
signals).
Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) have
demonstrated, as a part of motivation of their analysis, sensitivity of the
game theoretic predictions to the details of a type space used to model
a given set of hierarchies. Di¤erent types having the same hierarchies of
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beliefs about the payo¤ uncertainty may have di¤erent sets of rationalizable
strategies. Given this, the question arises whether the mechanism design
problems are also sensitive to the specication of a type space that gives
rise to a given set of hierarchies of beliefs about the underlying uncertainty,
e.g., payo¤ characteristics in the universal type space. In other words, which
of the predictions obtained in the mechanism design literature with payo¤-
based hierarchies of beliefs are robust to the details of type spaces that are
used to model those hierarchies?
To start with, one should mention that the existing mechanism design
literature has been working with the following version of the universal type
space. First, the fundamental uncertainty about which hierarchies of beliefs
are formed consists only of agentspayo¤ types (as it is what the mecha-
nism designer ultimately cares about). Second, agents interim types are
constructed by specifying a set of "abstract types" and two mappings from
the set of abstract types into a set of payo¤s and a set of feasible beliefs
types. Each belief type is a probability measure on other agentsabstract
types and thus on their payo¤s and their beliefs about everyone elses ab-
stract type, i.e. on the entire hierarchy of beliefs about payo¤ parameters.
In these constructions an agents belief types, i.e. probability measure over
types of others could be arbitrary and just appended to the set of possible
payo¤s rather than derived from a prior conditionally on the information.
We show that as a result of such modelling approach where di¤erent
models of agents information are unied into one model of the universal
type space, the mechanism designer, by disregarding some dimensions of
agentsinformation, may lose the ability to condition agentsallocations on
reports on these dimensions whereas such conditioning may allow to relax
the incentive compatibility constraints. The reason of such loss lies in both
above mentioned issues. Because of the second reason, agentsinformative
signals are not treated explicitly and so there is no scope for conditioning on
them. The information contained in the signals may be useful, for example,
for a scoring mechanism, where agent i is scored depending on how his report
about his payo¤ type matches  is reports of signals about is payo¤. As it
is known in the literature, such scoring could induce agents to reveal their
types truthfully, e.g. because they are informationally small in the sense of
McLean and Postlewaite (2002). And because of the rst issue, even if agents
informative signals are treated explicitly, the mechanism designer yet may
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lose information about beliefs about signals if he restricts attention to payo¤
based hierarchies of beliefs. For example, the lottery mechanism of Crémer
and McLean (1988) may work well if is beliefs about others signals are
informative about is payo¤ type, whereas his beliefs about others payo¤s
are not.
In this paper we deal in details exactly with this rst issue2. We demon-
strate that there exist social choice functions which are implementable on a
type space where "redundant types" are considered as separate types may
not be implementable on a type space where details of these "redundant
types" are ignored. To formalize this idea we construct rst an extended
type space a type space with payo¤-and-signals-based hierarchies of beliefs.
Then we provide an example how such payo¤-and-signals-based hierarchies
of beliefs could be mapped into payo¤-based hierarchies of beliefs only and
which information could be lost on the way. Finally we give an example of
social choice function which is implementable on type spaces with payo¤-
and-signals-based hierarchies of beliefs and which is not implementable on a
corresponding representation of a type space with payo¤-based hierarchies
of beliefs only.
Our results imply that impossibility results obtained on a given type
space with payo¤-based hierarchy of beliefs are non-robust. They are valid
only for that type space but not for "redundant" type spaces which have the
same payo¤s-based belief hierarchies but where agents di¤er in their infor-
mation. And so there could be an arbitrary number of models of information
with the same payo¤s and hierarchies of beliefs about the payo¤s and for
which there exist mechanisms achieving e¢ ciency by exploiting heterogene-
ity in information, i.e. in signals.
In this paper we do not require that agents share a common prior at the
ex ante stage, they could have any type of beliefs, e.g. also private priors
about others prior beliefs about the joint realization of payo¤s and signals.
However, in the last section we discuss under which conditions restricting
attention to payo¤-based hierarchies of beliefs is without loss of generality
2Concerning the issue of exogeneous structure on belief mappings, in Gizatulina and
Hellwig (2009) we have demonstrated that when agents form their hierarchies of beliefs
about others payo¤s and signals and when those are sequences of conditional beliefs
derived from a prior according to the Bayes rule, these hierarchies enjoy generically the
BDP property, i.e. they are unique to a given constellation of a payo¤ characteristic and
signals. Hence generically it is possible to achieve various e¢ ciency results.
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and it seems that the common prior plays a role in the sense that under
common priors two approaches are more likely to be equivalent than when
agents priors are heterogeneous and privately known.
In the following section we describe the environment. Then we show a
usual approach in the existing literature, i.e. construction of type spaces
with payo¤ based hierarchies of beliefs. Then we construct a payo¤ and
signals based universal type space where agents informative signals are a
part of explicit description of agentstypes. In the subsequent section we
show that the set of social choice functions implementable on a type space
with payo¤ and signals based beliefs hierarchies is strictly larger than the set
of social choice functions implementable on type spaces with payo¤-based
beliefs hierarchies into which an initial type space with payo¤ and signals-
based belief hierarchies is mapped. Finally, we provide the above mentioned
discussion and give conclusions.
3.2 The Environment
There is a nite set I of agents indexed by i = 1; :::; I. Each agent has a
payo¤ type i 2 i: Denote as usual the set of payo¤ types in the economy
by  = ii and its element :
There is a set of social outcomes G, with elements g. Each agent has a
utility function ui : Gi R! R; giving him some degree of utility as a
function of a social alternative g, his payo¤ type i and a potential monetary
transfer from R: That is we restrict attention to private values environments
agents utility does not depend as such on  i: A social choice function
is a mapping F :  ! G; so the choice of some alternative g depends only
on the vector  and if the mechanism designer knows ; he would like the
outcome to be F ():
3.3 Type Spaces
3.3.1 Payo¤s-Based Universal Type Space
Most of the mechanism design literature working with type spaces allowing
for privately know belief hierarchies (e.g. Neeman (2004), Bergemann and
Morris (2005), Heifetz and Neeman (2006), etc.) employ a construction
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suggested by Harsanyi (1967-68), which was formalized by Mertens and
Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993).
In this construction each agents information, relevant for his behav-
iour in a given strategic situation, is contained in his "type". Specically,
each agents type describes his payo¤ relevant characteristic as part of the
description of the state of nature and also his beliefs about others payo¤s
characteristics and othersbeliefs. It has been shown that all this informa-
tion could be succinctly represented by a triple (Yi;bi; bi) where Yi is agent
is "type space" containing a set of possible types yi; bi : Yi ! (Y i) is
a mapping dening agent is probabilistic beliefs about others types andbi : Yi ! i is a mapping dening agent is payo¤ type. Thus a given
realization of yi 2 Yi denes uniquely some (i; i):
From a given belief type i; dened on (Y i) it is possible to unfold
agents entire hierarchy of beliefs, i.e. his beliefs about otherspayo¤ types3,
his beliefs about other agentsbeliefs about everyones payo¤s and so on.
In other words each yi = (i; i) could be equivalently represented as an
innite dimensional vector
yi = (y
0
i ; y
1
i ; y
2
i ; :::) (3.1)
where
y0i = i 2 i; i.e. Y 0i  i (the zeroth level is agentpayo¤ );
y1i 2 Y 1i  (Y 0 i) (agent is beliefs about otherspayo¤s);
y2i 2 Y 2i  (Y 1 i) (agent is beliefs about others beliefs about everyones
payo¤s);
::::
yki 2 Y ki  (Y k 1 i ); etc.
The result of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993) was that any strategic situation, describable by some explicit hierar-
chy as in (3.1) has a unique representation as yi = (bi(yi); bi(yi)) provided
each order of beliefs yki = (Y
k 1
 i ) satises the following coherency condi-
tion
margY k 2 i
yki = y
k 1
i
where margY k 2 i
is the marginal on the space Y k 2 i . Any two types who
di¤er in their information but who has the same belief hierarchy about others
3For an analysis from an interim perspective, it is usually assumed that each agent
knows his own payo¤ type and own beliefs structure.
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payo¤s and others beliefs are called redundant. A type space containing all
types with hierarchies of beliefs about  which are non-redundant, i.e. which
do not have already a copy of themselves in this type space was named the
-based universal type space.
Note that agents may possess a common prior, i.e. there exist a i(Y ) =
j(Y ) = (Y ) such that conditionally on observing yi each agents belief
type is dened by
i(y ijyi) = (y i; yi)P
y i2Y i (y i; yi)
Alternatively agents may have heterogeneous though commonly known
priors about Y , then the above formula should be substituted by an ap-
propriate version, accounting for each i and  i (as other agentsinterim
beliefs types would depend on  i).
Finally, at the ex ante stage each agent may be uncertain about the
priors of the others. Then the underlying uncertainty consists of a cross
sectional distribution of payo¤s, signals and prior beliefs from which other
agents derive their beliefs hierarchies. In other words, the prior i is a
probability measure over ( i; Y ):
A collection (; Y ) with Y = iYi and  = ii denes a type space
from the prior perspective.
3.3.2 Extended Interim Type Space
Here instead of allowing agents to have at the interim stage beliefs only about
payo¤s and others beliefs, we allow that each agents type is characterized
in addition by a nite vector of signals which he believes to be strategically
relevant as they maybe correlated to otherspayo¤s, signals and belief types.
Each agents belief type describes then his beliefs about otherspayo¤, signal
and beliefs types, this is so-called "payo¤s and signals"-based, i.e. ( S)-
based universal type space.
The notation is standard, the set of possible payo¤s of an agent i is i
with  = ii; the set of signals is Si with S = iSi and we introduce
Ti = iSi, with T = iTi: The realization of agents type is the following
innite dimensional vector:
ti = (t
0
i ; t
1
i ; t
2
i ; :::) (3.2)
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with
t0i 2 T 0i  i  Si
t1i 2 T 1i  T 0i i(T 0 i)
t2i 2 T 2i  T 0i i(T 1 i)
and so on.
Similarly to the previous section the beliefs over the orders are required
to satisfy the coherency condition. Given this any agent type could be
represented as a triple
ti = ((ti); s(ti); (ti)):
We do not impose any requirement on the process that is behind a given
set of interim types, e.g. there does not have to be a common prior. Instead
for example at the ex ante stage each agent may possess a prior i over
( i    S); i.e. describing his prior beliefs about other agentspriors
and about a process distributing  and s across agents.
This construction subsumes, e.g., the construction of -hierarchies of
Ely and Peski (2006) if we interpret their "types" as payo¤ relevant charac-
teristics and informative signals.
Finally, as in the preceding section, this construction is consistent with
three possible types of priors: a common prior, heterogeneous but commonly
known and privately known priors.
3.3.3 Motivating Example
In this section we provide an example which is special cases of the con-
struction in the section 2.2 allowing for commonly known, heterogeneous
prior. This example shows how a mapping of ( S)-based model into -
based universal type space fails to satisfy the BDP property, whereas within
(  S)-based model agents beliefs about others signals in the extended
model are fully informative about his type.
Assume there are two agents, I = 2: Each agents type is two dimensional
and consists of his payo¤ and his signal about other agents payo¤: i 2
i and si 2 Si: We assume that at the ex ante stage two agents have
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heterogeneous prior about the joint realization of payo¤s and signals. Agent
is prior is
i
0BBB@
i
si
j
sj
1CCCA = N
0BBB@
0BBB@

0

0
1CCCA ;
0BBB@
1= 0 0 
0 1= 0 0
0 0 1= 0
 0 0 1=
1CCCA
1CCCA
with  > 0. Whereas agent jprior is
j
0BBB@
i
si
j
sj
1CCCA = N
0BBB@
0BBB@

0

0
1CCCA ;
0BBB@
1= 0 0 0
0 1=  0
0  1= 0
0 0 0 1=
1CCCA
1CCCA :
Agents agree on priorsmeans, variance and that covi(i; si) = covi(j ; sj) =
covj (i; si) = covj (j ; sj) = 0: But each agent believes that other agents
signal about his payo¤ is informative, i.e. covi(i; sj) =  (and similarly for
covj (j ; si) = ) whereas each of them believes that his own signal about
other agents payo¤ is fully noisy, i.e. covi(j ; si) = covj (i; sj) = 0.
Now let us consider each agents hierarchy of beliefs in the extended
universal type space and in the standard one.
The ( S)-based hierarchy of beliefs looks as follows:
k = 0 : t0i = (i; si)
k = 1 : t1i = i(t
0
j ) conditional on (i; si) each agent believes that the
other agents payo¤ and signals are distributed normally with the following
conditional means:
Ei [j ji; si] = Ei [j jsi] = Covi(si; j)
V ar(si)
(si   Ei [si]) + Ei [j ]
= Ei [j ]
= 
and
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Ei [sj ji; si] = Ei [sj ji] = Covi(sj ; i)
V ar(i)
(i   Ei [i]) + Ei [sj ]
= (i   )
k = 2 : t2i = i(t
1
j ) : agent is beliefs about agent js belief about
is payo¤s and signals are his beliefs about Ej [ijj ; sj ] and Ej [sijj ; sj ]
respectively.
Ei [Ej [ijj ; sj ] ji; si] = Ei

Covj (sj ; i)
V ar(sj)
(sj   Ej [sj ]) + Ej [i] ji; si

= Ei [Ej [i] ji; si]
= 
Ei [Ej [sijj ; sj ] ji; si] = Ei

Covj (si; j)
V ar(j)
(j   Ej [j ]) + Ej [si] ji; si

= Ei [(j   )ji; si]
= Ei [j ji; si]  
= (1  a)
and so on for t3i ; t
4
i ; :::
Now we shall construct a -based hierarchy of beliefs of this model.
y0i = i
y1i = i(y
0
j ) which, again, conditional on (i; si) each agent believes that
the other agents payo¤ is distributed normally with the following condi-
tional mean:
Ei [j ji; si] = Ei [j jsi] = Covi(si; j)
V ar(si)
(si   Ei [si]) + Ei [j ]
= Ei [j ]
= 
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y2i = i(y
1
j ) as i knows that Ej [ijj ; sj ] =  his beliefs about js belief
about is payo¤ are degenerate he puts probability 1 on j believing that
i is distributed normally with a mean  (and corresponding variance 1=
dened by the priors).
All -based higher order beliefs y3i ; y
4
i ; ::: are similarly degenerate.
Consequently, with such priors and information structure, each agents
-based beliefs hierarchy (in the form yi = ((yi); (yi)) is non-BDP, but
their (S)-based beliefs hierarchies, i.e. their types ti = ((ti); s(ti); (ti))
are BDP.
3.4 Results
The main result of the paper is
Theorem 3.1 The set of F () implementable on a -based interim type
space induced by some type space with (  S)-based hierarchies of beliefs
is a strict subset of F () implementable on the initial (  S)-based type
space.
First of all, the proof that any SCF which is implementable on a -based
representation of some (  S)-based type space is also implementable on
the initial ( S)-based type space could left as a remark. This result is a
straightforward consequence of the revelation principle.
Consider a mechanism in which all agents are asked to submit their -
based hierarchies of beliefs. By hypothesis, there exist incentive compatible
decision rule g(i(yi);  i(y i)) and payments fti(yi; y i)gi2I : Now suppose
that agents are asked to submit their (  S)-based hierarchies of beliefs.
Because the designer has no less informations as in the case where agents
are asked to submit their -based hierarchies of beliefs, he could design
the allocations as if agents had submitted -based hierarchies of beliefs and
achieve e¢ ciency.
We shall proceed to the second part of the proof. We show that there
exist functions F () and ( S)-based type spaces such that when only a
reduced type space, with -based hierarchies of beliefs is considered F ()
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is not implementable, whereas it is implementable on the initial type space
with ( S)-based hierarchies.
The proof is constructive we describe an environment (utilities and
types) and a social choice function which is implementable if the designer
could ask agents to report their payo¤s, signals and agents beliefs about
otherspayo¤s, signals and othersbeliefs, but which is not implementable
if the only information that the designer could have is a space of (reported)
payo¤s and beliefs about otherspayo¤s induced by payo¤ and signals based
space. This construction is based on the fact that agents-based beliefs
are non-informative about his payo¤ type, i.e. they fail the BDP condition,
whereas his (S)-beliefs satisfy the BDP property, hence we could employ
the mechanism as in Crémer and McLean (1988) to achieve e¢ ciency.
3.4.1 Proof of the Theorem: Part 2
Utilities, SCF and Type Space
Recall, there is a nite number of agents, indexed by i = 1; ::; I: Agents have
to make a decision whether to change a status quo allocation. There is a
social alternative g (in our case the level of a public good) taking a value in a
set G of possible values. Agents have to aggregate their preferenceswhether
to switch to an alternative allocation (i.e. how much of a public good to
have).
Each agents utility is quasi-linear:
ui(i; g;mi) = ig +mi (3.3)
where mi is utility from money, i is preferences parameter and vi(i; g)
is utility from the public good when it is at some level g (throughout the
paper only the private values case is considered so vi() depends only on i).
A social choice rule F : ! G maps a prole of payo¤ types ( = i)
into a social alternative (the level of public good). In this paper it is assumed
that the objective is to maximize the aggregate welfare for each realization
of the vector , i.e. the social choice rule is ex post e¢ cient.
The cost of a public good is constant per capita and equals  with
I   = K(I): In this case an e¢ cient social choice rule, based on the goal of
maximization of social welfare, prescribes provision of a public good when-
ever
P
i i  K(I):
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We shall restrict attention to a belief-closed subset of (  S)-based
universal type space satisfying three assumptions, labeled F; R and I. The
rst assumption says that agents payo¤s are from nite set whereas agents
signals are allowed to belong to an interval in RSi .
Assumption F: For each i the set i is nite and the set Si 2 RSi
We also assume that it is common knowledge that each agents belief
type could be fully described by a vector of parameters, taking values in a
compact interval in RM :
Assumption R4: Any interim belief type (t ijti) is uniquely describ-
able by a vector i 2 RM
i = (
1
i ; ::; 
M
i ) (3.4)
and it is continuous in (1i ; ::; 
M
i ) i.e. for each m there is a sequence of
mi (k) such that
lim
k!1
mi (k)! mi
and
lim
k!1
Z
t i2T i
f(:)dk(t ijti)!
Z
t i2T i
f(:)d(t ijti)
for all bounded and continuous functions f : T i ! R:
For example a vector (1i ; ::; 
M
i ) could be a vector of M moments den-
ing the probability measure over T i (note that multidimensionality of T i
is not an issue a vector (1i ; ::; 
M
i ) is just a convention for corresponding
parameters of the p.d.f. which may be matrices as well). Then, by the con-
tinuity theorem for moment generating functions we know that if X1; X2; :::
is a sequence of random variables with corresponding (presumably existing)
moment generating functions '1(:); '2(:); ::: then Xk !d X (in distribution)
if and only if 'n(:)! '(:) for each moment:
Because by construction ((ti); s(ti); (ti)) is homeomorphic to (t0i ; t
1
i ; t
2
i ; :::),
the continuity of ((ti); s(ti); (ti)) in (1i ; ::; 
M
i ) implies the continuity of
(t0i ; t
1
i ; t
2
i ; :::) in (
1
i ; ::; 
M
i ) (for each order t
k
i ).
4This quite simplfying assumption is made in order to avoid dealing with any topolog-
ical notions of closeness of innite belief hierarchies.
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This means that, in addition to (t0i ; t
1
i ; t
2
i ; :::) and ((ti); (ti)) the third
representation of each agents type, given the assumed restriction, is possible:
ti = (i; si; 
1
i ; ::; 
M
i ) (3.5)
where (1i ; ::; 
M
i )(ti) denes belief type i(ti) of an agent i when he is
type ti; from which in turn a sequence as in (3.2) could be unfold.
Given the above condition the dimensionality of agent type Ti is labelled
by ni =M + Si + 1: We will refer to a member of ni by in:
The last assumption that T = Ti should be satisfying is the following
(where si i j is the vector of signals of all agents but j about is type):
Assumption I:
 There exist no functions q( i) and q( i) such that either Ei [q( i)jti]
or Ei

q( i)jti

would be an injective mapping from (i; 1i ; ::; 
M
i ) into
R:
 But there exists a function q(sin i j) and agents j and k such that for
each ti (i 6= j 6= k) and for each dimension in 2 ni it holds:
A. Ei
h
q(sin i j)jti
i
is an injective mapping from (i; 1i ; ::; 
M
i ) into R;
B. X
in2ni
Ei
h 
q(sin i j)  Ei

q(sin i j)jti
2 jtii (*)

X
kn2nk
Ei

q(skn k i)  Ek
h
q(skn k i)jti
i2 jti
We discuss in details the consistence of the rst bullet point with the
part A of the second bullet point in the next subsection, in the Proposition
3.2. The last term in the 2nd bullet point requires that agent is sum of con-
ditional variances in the value of q(:) as a function of signals about his type
is weakly smaller than the sum of conditional variances of q(:) as function of
signals about some agent k: This condition is satised for example when the
variance in signals is independent of types and the same across the agents.
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Result
The rst proposition asserts that the Assumption I has more than an empty
set of type spaces, i.e. it is internally consistent.
Proposition 3.2 There exists type spaces (; S;) which satisfy the As-
sumption I.
Proof. Example 1 is one such type space. Recall that there are two agents
each having one signal, so we let q(sin i j) = sj and the same for signal
about agent j: As it was shown, agent is expectation about agent js signal
about his payo¤ is a 1:1 function of his payo¤ type i.e. Ei
h
q(sin i j)jti
i
=
Ei [sj jti] = i, idem for agent j. Then take q( i) = j , we have Ei [j jti] = 
and obviously there is no any function which would be dependent only on
j which would provide with more information about ti: Finally as all Mj
and Mi are commonly known and independent of the realization of i we
have the result.
In the remaining we show that asking agents for their (i;b(ti); bs(ti))
allows us to achieve e¢ ciency under assumptions R, I and F.
Proposition 3.3 For each interim type space (Ti;b(ti); bs(ti); b(ti)) satis-
fying the assumptions R,I and F there exists a scoring mechanism with the
truthful Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. The allocations achievable in the truth-
ful equilibrium of the scoring mechanism are ex post e¢ cient, satisfy the ex
post budget balance condition and interim individual rationality constraints.
Perfect working of the scoring mechanism that we construct is insured
by the assumptions I and F: By the assumption I if we know agents beliefs
about others signals we could learn his payo¤ and his belief type, so we
could construct a vector of payments conditional on othersreports of their
signals about i such that each i by revealing his expectation about others
signals reveals uniquely his payo¤ and belief type. The assumption F allows
to disentangle each di¤erent payo¤ type by putting a nite weight on the
score for agents report of his payo¤ type.
In the remaining part of this section we provide a constructive proof of
the theorem. Agent is reporting strategy is eti : Ti ! Ti. When an agent
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makes a truthful announcement his strategy is denoted eti(ti) = ti and when
he mispresents on either dimension of ti we use eti(ti) = t0i:
Definition 3.4 (Scoring Mechanism) The scoring mechanism is the fol-
lowing three stage game:
1. The designer proposes an allocation rule (as a function of agentsre-
ports about their types):
 the individual payment function mi : eT ! R with:
mi (et) = (i(eti);et i) +Qi(et j) Qk(et i) if g = 1 and
mi (et) = Qi(et j) Qk(et i) if g = 0;
 the public good provision rule g : eT ! f0; 1g with:
g = 1 if
P
i i(eti)  K(I) and
g = 0 otherwise;
 the ex post budget balance condition:P
im

i (et) = K(I) if g = 1 andP
im

i (et) = 0 otherwise.
2. Agents vote to play the scoring mechanism given the above allocation
rule. If there is an unanimous vote to play the scoring game, each
agent reports eti: Otherwise the allocation is: g = 0; mi (et) = 0
3. Given the behaviour at the stage 2 individual allocations specied by
the mechanism are obtained.
In the payment function mi (et); the term Qi(et j) is the score each i is
assigned conditionally on his report and reports of all other agents but j
about the distribution of types in the economy. This score is a weighted
average of the scores on each dimension in 2 i;i; si ; si	
Qi(et j) =X
in
wnQ
in
i( j) (3.6)
where wn is a weight given to a scoreQni( j) from a dimension in: The applied
scoring rule is the quadratic score
Qini( j) = (bt i jin   etin)2 (3.7)
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where bt i jin is an estimate of is type in dimension in by all the remaining
agents but agent j; i.e. by  i  j: We set the estimator bt i jin to be bt i jin =
q(sin i j); i.e. it is a function of signals reported by  i   j about is type
on some dimension in satisfying the assumption I:2: The term Qk(et i) is a
similar score assigned to an agent k which is independent of the reports of
agent i: The term (i(eti);et i) inmi (et) is a function that denes the way the
ex post surplus from the provision of a public good is redistributed among
the agents given all announcements. Because the mechanism is e¢ cient we
have
(i(eti);et i)  i(eti)
i.e. agents never contribute to the public good more than their valuation.
The next proposition provides details on incentive compatibility of the
scoring game.
Proposition 3.5 (Incentive Compatibility) For each i there exist a
vector of weights wni such that, if agent i conjectures that other agents ( i)
report truthfully t i reporting truthfully ti constitutes the best reply strategy
for agent i:
Proof. Each agents expected utility given his strategy and given that he
expect truthful strategies from the others (i.e. et i = t i) is
EUi(eti; t i; ti) = Ei hg(ei;  i)jtii i   Ei mi(eti; t i)jti =
= Ei
h
g(ei;  i)jtii (i   (ei; t i)) 
 Ei

Qi(eti; t i j)jti+ Ei [Qk(tk; t k i)jti]
Here e is a short-cut for i(eti(ti)).
The term Ei
h
g(ei;  i)jtii (i   (ei; t i)) arises because by rules of the
mechanism each agent pays (ei; t i) ex post only if the public good is
provided, it happens with a probability5 Ei
h
g(ei;  i)jtii :
By construction of the mechanism each agents report on a dimension
in0 does not a¤ect his score on the dimension in00; so these could be treated
5As usual in the literature, we use interchangely the expected level of the public good
and expected probability of provision of a public good in a unit of 1.
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separately. First we study agents incentives when reporting i: Consider any
deviation 0i 6= i: The existence of a weight w; inducing truthful reporting
of i, follows from the IC constraint
Ei
h
g(ei;  i)jtii (i   (ei; t i))  wEi hQi(ei; si i j)jtii
 Ei
h
g(e0i;  i)jtii (i   (e0i; t i))  wEi hQi(e0i; si i j)jtii
(we omit Ei

Qk(etk; t k i)jti as it is independent on the report of i and so
does not a¤ect his incentives). Rearranging this brings us a condition on
w :
w 
Ei
h
g(e0i;  i)jtii (i   (e0i; t i))  Ei hg(ei;  i)jtii (i   (ei; t i))
Ei
h
Qi(e0i; si i j)jtii  Ei hQi(ei; si i j)jtii
(3.8)
with w = max
ti;t0i;;t i2T
w(ti; t
0
i):
A nite weight w exists if for any possible ei and e0i this expression is
nite. In turn it means that the nominator should be nite and the denom-
inator strictly greater than zero. This requirement is obviously satised for
the nominator, as all variables are bounded. The strict positivity of the
denominator is due to the following. By reporting any ei agent expects his
score to be
Ei
h
Qi (
ei; si i j)jtii = Ei h(q(si i j)  ei)2jtii
= Ei
h
(q(si i j)  Ei
h
q(si i j)
i
+ Ei
h
q(si i j)
i
  ei)2jtii
= Ei
h
((q(si i j)  Ei
h
q(si i j)
i
)2 + (Ei
h
q(si i j)
i
  ei)2jtii
He expects it to be minimized when ei = Ei hq(si i j)jtii (from which
the value of i could be uniquely found by the Assumption I:2:) If agent
mispresents his type, i.e. he reports ei 6= Ei hq(si i j)jtii the second term
is strictly positive in expectation, hence we have Ei
h
Qi (
e0i; si i j)jtii >
Ei
h
Qi (
ei; si i j)jtii :
Extraction of agents belief type is straightforward. Given that i expects
that s
mi
 i j are reported truthfully, each i while maximizing his expected
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utility is minimizing his expected payment as it is the only part of the
utility a¤ected by his report of mi : Hence he minimizes:
Ei

Qimi jti

= Ei
h
(bt i jimi   etmii )2jtii (3.9)
Rewriting this again as in the above case:
Ei

Qimi

= Ei
h
(bt i jimi   Ei hbt i jimi i)2 + (Ei hbt i jimi i  etmii )2jtii (3.10)
one observes that Ei

Qimi

is minimized when
etmi i = Ei hbt i jimi jtii = Ei hq(smi i j)jtii (3.11)
As Ei
h
q(s
mi
 i j)jti
i
is an injective mapping from (i; mi ) one learns 
m
i for
any m 2M .
The incentive compatibility for revealing signals is straightforward, it
follows from the weak indi¤erence argument. No misreporting of sjni ( j 6=
k 6= i) could improve allocation of i, it could only worsen it by increasing
the expected score. This is because apart of Ei
h
Q
sjni
i
a report of sjni does
not a¤ect the level of a public good g() nor it changes Ei

Qk(et i) : This
means i could not sponge o¤ into his pocket proceeds from an increased
score of any other agent as the ex post payment of Qj for some j 6= k is paid
to agent l and i in turn receives proceeds from Qk which are independent
of any report of i by construction. Thus we could always nd an "-reward
scheme, such that if i reports truthfully his signals he gets " (conditionally
on some nite score) and he gets 0 otherwise.
Proposition 3.6 (Interim Individual Rationality) Given that the de-
cision rule is e¢ cient, any i; when votes to play the scoring game, expects
the interim individual rationality constraint
Ei [ig(t
) mi(t)jti]  0:
to be satised in the truthful equilibrium of the scoring game.
Proof. Recall that the expected utility in the truthful equilibrium is
Ei [ig(t
) mi(t)jti] = Ei

g(i ; 

 i)jti

(i   (i ))
 Ei

Qi(t

i ; t

 i j)jti

+ Ei

Qk(t

k; t

 k i)jti

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Given the condition () in the Assumption I we have that in the truthful
equilibrium
Ei

Qi(t

i ; t

 i j)jti
  Ei Qk(tk; t k i)jti
Given that i   (i) > 0 for any i in the truthful equilibrium (by the
e¢ ciency of provision decision) we have that
Ei

g(ti ; t

 i)jti

(i(t

i )  ((ti )))  0
Hence is the result.
Proposition 3.7 (Budget Balance) Any equilibrium of the scoring game
satises the ex post budget balance condition.
Proof. We balance the budget as follows. If ex post the public good is
not provided, no payments are made to the designer, but agent i pays to
j the ex post value of Qi(t j) and receives from agent k his corresponding
Qk(t

 i): With I > 2 we could always settle such transfers.
If g = 1 and somi (t) are positive, nd some (:) such that
P
i ((t

i )) =
K: The side transfers among agents are as in the case with g = 0:
Three proofs imply the Theorem.
There is one additional remark. To demonstrate the possibility result we
have assumed that the set  is nite. Allowing for  to be an interval does
not change much the qualitative part of our conclusions each agents sur-
plus could be extracted up to an arbitrary " amount, similarly to the result
of McAfee and Reny (1992). It could be demonstrated as follows. Divide 
into K intervals denoted
nb1; ::;bk; ::;bKo with bk = k; k and k 1 = k;
such that k k  ": Each agent, instead of reporting i is allowed to report
only the interval bk such that i 2 bk; that is we "discretize" the reports6.
Run the scoring mechanism as above with the only modication of the
agents scoring rule as
Qi (
ei; q(esi i j)) = 0 if q(esi i j) 2 bk and ei 2 bk
Qi (
ei; q(esi i j)) > 0 if q(esi i j) 2 bk and ei =2 bk
6A similar discretizing technique was employed in Miller, Pratt, Zeckhauser, and John-
son (2007).
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Next dene a system of weights w as in the case with nite ; fully simi-
larly to (3.8) inducing agents to report truthfully the interval bk where their
valuations fall into. Such nite weights exists again because the denomina-
tor is strictly positive, as if ei = e0i =2 bk Ei hQi (e0i; q(esi i j))jtii > 0 and
Ei
h
Qi (
e0i; q(esi i j))jtii = 0 if ei 2 bk: Each agent contributes only (k)
which, by choosing an appropriate constellation of w and K could be made
to be arbitrary close to (i ): The individual rationality and the budget
balance conditions follow immediately, similarly to the case with nite :
Thus, the richness of the payo¤ type space as such does not preclude us
to extract almost the entire agentssurplus.
3.5 Discussion: Further Research
3.5.1 On equivalence of two approaches
The question that arises from the result of this paper is then the follow-
ing: under which conditions, asking agents to report only their -based
hierarchies of beliefs is without loss of generality?
There are two possible questions to consider:
1. When by knowing only -based hierarchies of beliefs of agents imple-
mentation results are the same as if we knew agents (  S)-based
hierarchies of beliefs?
2. When by knowing only -based hierarchies of beliefs of agents could
we recover precisely what would be their ( S)-based hierarchies of
beliefs?
For the rst question it is obvious that when it is impossible to implement
a given social choice function on a type space with (S)-based hierarchies
of beliefs it is also impossible to implement it on a -based hierarchies. Also,
as a part of our theorem shows, when it is possible to implement a SCF on
-based hierarchies of beliefs it is also possible to do it on (  S)-based
hierarchies of beliefs.
The answer to the second question is two-fold. It is impossible to recover
agents ( S)-hierarchy of beliefs from -based one if:
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1. (a) -based hierarchy of beliefs is independent of values of si (as it
was in our motivating example);
(b) -based hierarchy is dependent on si but from -based beliefs
we cannot solve for the values of si:
The question a. in the essence is just a special case of the second one,
but for clarity we shall discuss them rather separately. In the following we
consider potential severity of both issues in the models with a common
prior, with heterogeneous but known priors and nally where agents have
heterogenous and privately known prior beliefs.
Common prior case Under a common prior the rst issue of indepen-
dence does not arise, as agents agree on whether signals bear any informa-
tion or not, so if signals are non-informative the -based hierarchy of beliefs
would not depend on them, whereas the ( S)-hierarchy of beliefs would
depend on them but would not provide any more information about agents
payo¤s than the -based hierarchy of beliefs.
However under common priors the second issue yet may be present.
Gizatulina and Hellwig (2009) have demonstrated that generically if the
mechanism designer knows agents (  S)-hierarchies of beliefs he could
learn the specic values of their payo¤s and signals. However if the designer
knows only the -based hierarchies of agents beliefs, the answer to the
question whether information about the signals is available, i.e. whether he
could "reconstruct" (S)-hierarchies and whether he could condition the
allocation on the reported signals is yet open.
Recall that when agents form their hierarchies of beliefs about oth-
ers payo¤s they condition the common prior on their signals. Thus any
y1 = i( i) is a conditional probability, i.e. it could be rewritten as
y1i = i( iji; si). Similarly for each agent j 6= i; y1j = j( j jj ; sj): For
the second order we have y2i = i(y
1
 i) = i( i( ( i)j i; s i)ji; si): So
under common priors either y1i or y
2
i should be dependent on agent is entire
prole of signals about otherspayo¤s and otherssignals as each signal that
i has is informative either about otherspayo¤s (and so it enters into his
rst order beliefs) or about others signals (then it enters then into his beliefs
about othersbeliefs, i.e. his second order beliefs).
This means that we could learn agents signals from -based beliefs if
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we could "invert" it. To do this we may, for example, construct a system of
equations of conditional moments of y1i ; y
2
i ; :: (which, arguably, depend on
unknown (i; si)) and solve this system for values of (i; si): If it is possible
to accomplish, the two approaches are equivalent and so there is no loss in
generality in considering only payo¤ based hierarchies of beliefs. Arguably,
this possibility depends on the details of the information process and it is
an open question how often one could do it, i.e. how generic is equivalence
of two approaches under the common prior assumption.
Heterogenous known priors When agents do not share a common prior
though their priors are known it may happen, as in our motivating example,
that no ones rst or second order beliefs about otherspayo¤s depend on
agents signals as no one believes signals to be informative. Hence we cannot
recover information about signals from -based beliefs alone, so two ap-
proaches are not equivalent. Also, regarding the issue in b. even if agents
rst or second order beliefs are yet dependent on signals, again as in the
case with a common prior the equivalence of two approaches depends on the
existence of solutions to the system of moments equations.
Private heterogenous prior beliefs Finally, when agents prior beliefs
are also their information, two approaches are even less likely to be equiv-
alent. As in the case with commonly known heterogenous priors, agents
beliefs about everyones payo¤s may be well independent from their be-
liefs about everyones signals. The second problem possibility to solve for
(i; si) aggravates. If agents prior beliefs are not commonly known (e.g. if
we would like to avoid any parametrization of the ex ante stage) and if the
payo¤ and signals are from compact intervals (rather than discrete sets), in
order to reconstruct (  S)-based hierarchy of beliefs from the -based
one we have to solve for (i; si) and i( i    S). Hence when i is
allowed to be arbitrary we need to solve for an innity of values7. Even if
on the other hand, -based hierarchy of beliefs provides us with an innity
7But if we would like to restrict our analysis to a class of priors, which are fully
paramterizable by some nite vector of paramters, as in our construction of priors de-
scirbable by i = (
1
i ; ::; 
M
i ); the problem of nding the values of (i; si) is easened.
Simply from the -based innite hierarchy of beliefs the designer has to solve for the
vector (i; si; 1i ; ::; 
M
i ):
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of observations on (i; si) and i(iS) it is not trivial to say how an
innite dimensional system of equation will behave.
Full force exploration of the question when two approaches are equivalent
is left for our further research.
3.5.2 On "minimal type spaces"
Another question that arises from the results of this paper is what is the
"minimal" type space capturing all necessary and su¢ cient details of agents
information that may be employed for the analysis of the mechanism design
problems?
Ely and Peski (2006) have proved that to nd type-space invariant pre-
dictions about rationalizable strategies in a given game it is necessary and
su¢ cient to specify agents conditional hierarchies of beliefs, i.e. ()-based
universal type space. But, as they themselves say this, such specication is
working only for that solution concept and changing the concept would en-
tail necessity to change the minimal description of agents information (see
also their discussion of the danger that too many strategically redundant
types who behave similarly but who has di¤erent belief hierarchies maybe
generated, p.23, footnote 6).
What would be the minimal universal type space for the mechanism
design problems is an open question. In our paper suggests that specifying
( S)-based hierarchies changes predictions from the case where only -
based UTS is considered. However we do not prove that this ( S)-based
specication is either necessary or su¢ cient to obtain type space invariant
prediction. Though we suspect that under the common prior assumption it
would be both necessary and su¢ cient description of the environment.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Any impossibility result obtained on a type space with -based hierarchies
of beliefs is tight, it is valid only for that specic environment and there
may exists a large set of "redundant" type spaces, having the same payo¤s
and belief hierarchies about payo¤s and beliefs about payo¤s etc. but where
yet agents di¤er in informative signals on which they condition their beliefs
about others payo¤s and others beliefs, and where the mechanism designer
84
PREFACE
could achieve implementation by conditioning on reported signals.
The issue of robust implementation notwithstanding, our result ques-
tions to which extent asking agents to report only their payo¤ and beliefs
types from the universal type space in a direct revelation mechanisms is
an appropriate technique to be used in environments where agents possess
nontrivial privately known beliefs.
Also, among other things, our result extends the set of type spaces on
which mechanisms exploiting the BDP property work. Specically, compared
to Crémer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) we allow agents
not to possess a common prior and their beliefs about others payo¤s types
do not have to be informative about their own payo¤ types.
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